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During  1993 a  shrill  public  debate  over  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) took place in the United States. The idea of negotiating 
one or more bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) had initially been raised by 
the Reagan administration in the early  1980s. The dual intent of  proposing 
these agreements was to lower barriers to trade with important U.S. economic 
partners  and  to  build  pressure  for  multilateral  reforms  under  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After a delay of  several years, an 
Israel-U.S. agreement developed relatively quickly and was approved by Con- 
gress in May  1985. The multilateral Uruguay Round GATT negotiations were 
launched subsequently (September 1986), and a bilateral agreement with Can- 
ada was approved in September 1988. 
Mexico proposed developing a FTA  with the United States in May  1990. 
The  GATT  negotiations  were  stalled,  but  entering  into  a  bilateral  trade 
agreement with Mexico was more controversial than the previous agreements 
with Israel and Canada. Nevertheless, the United  States embraced negotia- 
tions, which were expanded to include Canada in 1991. A trilateral agreement 
was reached in August 1992 and was signed by the three heads of state in De- 
cember. 
With the change in  administration early in  1993, newly elected President 
Clinton sought supplementary (side) agreements to clarify and strengthen the 
original provisions of NAFTA with respect to environmental protection, labor 
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rights, and mechanisms to protect domestic producers from unanticipated im- 
port surges. Negotiations for these side-agreements were completed in August. 
Still facing substantial domestic opposition to NAFTA, the Clinton administra- 
tion then launched an intense campaign for passage of the implementing legis- 
lation. It won a crucial and surprisingly large come-from-behind victory with 
a majority of Republican support when the House of Representatives approved 
the bill on November  17 by a 234-200  vote. This decision set the stage for 
concluding efforts on the multilateral  GATT negotiations in December  1993, 
and NAFTA took effect January  I, 1994. 
This paper focuses on the attempts of  U.S. agricultural interest groups to 
influence the outcomes of both the negotiations for NAFTA and the congres- 
sional debate over its implementing legislation. The objectives of the analysis 
are to investigate the goals and strategies of  different interest groups and to 
evaluate the success of  their efforts either to have NAFTA create expanded 
export opportunities or to limit the scope of the agreement in order to retain 
existing protection. Agricultural issues have loomed large in world trade dis- 
cussions since the inception of  the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations,  and 
Canada  and  Mexico are important  agricultural trade partners  of  the United 
States; they account jointly for more than one-fourth of U.S. agricultural im- 
ports and one-sixth of U.S. agricultural exports. For these reasons, the agricul- 
tural provisions of NAFTA became an important component of the agreement. 
Moreover, agricultural interests ultimately played a crucial role in the coalition 
that supported the NAFTA implementing legislation. 
More  specifically, the  agricultural commodity  groups became  aligned  as 
supporters of trade liberalization under NAFTA or as proponents of limits on 
the scope of the agreement based on their particular interests in trade with 
Mexico and Canada and their perceptions of NAFTA's  broader implications. 
Early in the negotiations, the various groups confronted a high-level decision 
by  Mexico and the United  States to include all agricultural products under 
provisions for long-run liberalization. The U.S. agricultural groups supporting 
trade liberalization had some influence on this decision, but it was more widely 
attributed to willingness of Mexico to remove trade barriers from its politically 
sensitive and historically highly protected corn sector. 
Under the negotiated agreement announced in August 1992,  all licenses and 
quotas restricting Mexico-U.S. agricultural trade were to be converted to tariffs 
in January 1994. These and other tariffs were also to be completely phased out 
over adjustment periods of up to 15 years. Canada had resisted such full cover- 
age of the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, and the U.S. agricultural groups 
and others favoring liberalized trade had  not been able to extract Canadian 
concessions. Instead, it had been agreed that pending modification by an Uru- 
guay  Round  GATT  agreement,  the  less  comprehensive  Canada-U.S.  FTA, 
which left nontariff bamers intact for dairy, poultry, and other sectors, would 
remain in effect for bilateral Canada-U.S. trade. Mexico and Canada had nego- 
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Because NAFTA promised to liberalize U.S. agricultural trade with Mexico, 
the agreement as negotiated received support in the United States from market- 
oriented  general-membership  farm  organizations  and  from  most  export- 
oriented producers of grains, oilseeds, livestock, and some horticultural prod- 
ucts. The dairy and cotton sectors, although protected by U.S. import quotas, 
joined the NAFTA supporters when it became apparent that Mexico had little 
capacity  to  produce  competitive  imports  and  strong  rules  of  origin  were 
adopted. 
The NAFTA negotiations and the August 1992 agreement were opposed by 
farm groups favoring restrictive supply controls to raise domestic prices, wheat 
producers seeking leverage on Canadian export subsidy issues, and protected 
sugar, peanut, and citrus and other winter fruit and vegetable producers ob- 
jecting to specific transition-period provisions. The presidential election in No- 
vember  1992 appeared to open renewed opportunities for influence by  these 
groups, but the side-agreements negotiated by the new Clinton administration 
were limited in scope. Dissatisfied with these results, the producer groups op- 
posed  to various  NAFTA provisions  sought further  accommodations in  the 
subsequent legislative debate. Willingness to withdraw their opposition in ex- 
change for specific concessions gave them substantial bargaining power rela- 
tive to organized labor and others committed to the defeat of the NAITA im- 
plementing legislation. 
As the heavily contested congressional vote approached in November 1993, 
critical  support  for the  implementing  legislation  from agricultural  interest 
groups (or at least the withdrawal of their active opposition) came at the ex- 
pense of some weakening of  the original agreement and other related  costs. 
Concessions made to agricultural interests protected U.S. sugar from Mexican 
competition, provided  some transition-period protection to winter fruits and 
vegetables, and ensnared the United States in disputes about Canadian exports 
of wheat and peanut butter. While the long-run provisions for agricultural trade 
liberalization remained  intact,  with the final concessions  NAFTA results  in 
essentially no reform of entrenched domestic agricultural support programs in 
the United States (or Canada) during the lengthy tariff phase-out periods. Thus, 
those interests favoring more open trade can only be judged partially success- 
ful in their efforts and, likewise, the NAFTA process only partially successful 
in expanding international market opportunities, at least for the next 10 to 15 
years. 
To develop  these themes, this  paper is organized  as follows. Section 7.1 
provides a brief description of U.S. agricultural production, trade, and price 
support policies as a basis for evaluating the stakes of various interest groups 
in NAFTA. Section 7.2 examines the initial positions of the agricultural inter- 
est groups and their strategies for influencing the negotiations. Next, the pro- 
visions of the negotiated  agreement are summarized and public  and private 
sector assessments of these provisions are reviewed. The focus then turns to 
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the various agricultural interest groups during the congressional debate over 
the implementing legislation, and the final concessions and guarantees offered 
to obtain support for the legislation from agricultural interests. The conclud- 
ing section addresses some issues raised by  the NAFTA outcomes for agri- 
culture. 
7.1  Diversity within Agriculture 
From an aggregate perspective, agriculture represents less than 3 percent of 
national output. Even so, agricultural production is diffused among many di- 
verse sectors. Descriptive statistics about production, aggregate trade, and bi- 
lateral trade with Canada and Mexico at the outset of the NAFTA negotiations 
(1989-91  averages) are presented  for the  major  groups of  commodities in 
table 7.1. 
Grains and oilseeds accounted for one-fifth of the value of U.S. production 
of agricultural commodities and their direct products during 1989-91.  Grains 
and oilseeds are generally exported crops, with one-fourth of the value of pro- 
duction sold in world markets and the percentage as high as 60 to 75 percent 
for wheat and rice. Imports of grains and oilseeds are minimal but imports 
from Canada comprised over one-third of their value, and essentially all of the 
value of imported wheat, barley, and soybeans. 
Livestock and poultry products accounted for another one-fifth of the value 
of domestic agricultural production during  1989-91.  The United  States has 
maintained some quantitative meat import restrictions, and trade has been less 
important for livestock and poultry products than for grains and oilseeds. The 
value of  imports and the value of exports of  livestock and poultry products 
were less than 5 percent, respectively, of the value of domestic production. Of 
this trade, Canada produced over 35 percent of U.S. import value and Mexico 
another 10  percent. Canada and Mexico each accounted for over 15 percent of 
the value of U.S. exports. 
A third group of commodities important in the context of NAFTA are those 
for which the United States has traditionally imposed import quotas under sec- 
tion 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of  1935 and its extensions. The 
section 22 legislation authorized trade restrictions when imports “render inef- 
fective or materially interfere with” domestic supply control and price support 
programs of the US.  Department of Agriculture (USDA). Dairy products, cot- 
ton, and peanuts are among the commodities for which there have been section 
22 quotas. Imports of  these commodities have been restricted to less than 2 
percent of domestic production. Exports of dairy products were also less than 
2 percent of domestic production at the beginning of the NAFTA negotiations, 
but exports accounted for more than 40 percent of U.S. cotton and 15 percent 
of the value of peanut production.’ Mexico received over one-third of the US. 
1. Dairy products are priced  above world levels in domestic markets and are exported with 
subsidies, while the price support mechanisms for cotton facilitate exports at most times despite Table 7.1  U.S. Production and lkade of Agricultural Products, 1989-91 Averages 
U.S. Imports  U.S. Exports 
Total  Canada  Mexico  Total  Canada  Mexico 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Percentage  of  of  Percentage  of  of 
of  Total  Total  of  Total  Total 
Commodity  Production’ Amount” Production  Amounta  Imports  Amount”  Imports  Amounta Production  Amounta  Exports  Amount”  Exports 
Grains and oilseeds  86,633 
Livestock and  85,520 
Section 22 commodities 
poultry 
Dairy products  43,932 
Cotton  4.627 
Peanuts  1.260 
Sugar  4.574 
Sugar-containing  53,203 
products 
Horticultural 
Vegetablesb  18,540 
Winter vegetables  1.290 
Citrus juices  1.154 
Other fruitsc  9,279 
Subtotal  310,012 
Other‘  83,539 















1.93  646  38.71  45 
4.10  1.245  35.47  358 
1.84  15  1.86  <.05 
.09  <.05  1.25  .70 
.87  4  36.37  <.05 
14.63  14  2.09  13 
2.49  357  26.94  73 
6.85  170  13.39  343 
43.64  11  1.95  523 
41.76  1  <.05  66 
24.95  62  2.68  300 
4.07  2,525  20.00  1,722 
16.91  1,768  12.51  768 





























24.23  595  2.83  1,445 
3.48  505  16.98  476 
.74  18  5.55  123 
40.11  67  3.61  50 
16.59  40  19.14  7 
4.00  25  13.66  82 
3.09  447  27.20  115 
7.92  481  32.71  100 
9.84  121  95.27  3 
17.59  79  38.92  <.05 
20.29  559  29.69  43 
10.28  2,937  9.22  2,444 
11.40  1,213  12.72  33 1 















Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC 1993). 
% million dollars. 
bExcludes winter vegetables. 
‘Includes citrus other than juices. 
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dairy exports and provided one-sixth of the U.S. cotton imports. Canada pro- 
vided almost one-third of the U.S. imports of  peanuts and peanut products. 
Historically,  section  22 quotas on imports of  sugar and  sugar-containing 
products were also used to protect US. producers and give preferential treat- 
ment to selected foreign suppliers. Domestic production of cane and beet sugar 
has increased since 1980  under the most recent trade restrictions. High domes- 
tic sugar prices have also contributed to use of high-fructose corn sweeteners 
increasing from less than one-fourth of total caloric sweetener consumption in 
1979-8 1 to almost one-half in 1989-9 1. 
The U.S. sugar import quotas were challenged by Australia in  1989 under 
GA'IT rules because domestic supply controls were not in effect at that time.' 
To settle the GATT dispute, the import quotas were replaced by a two-tier tariff 
regime. Under the two-tier tariffs, a limited quantity of imports, known as a 
tariff-rate quota (TRQ), enters under a low rate ($0.0  l/lb). Potential additional 
imports carry an over-quota tariff of more than 80 percent ($0.18/lb). 
While in principle the two-tier sugar tariff regime allows access to the US. 
market in response to world market conditions, the over-quota tariffs have been 
prohibitive  and the TRQ and two-tier tariffs have had trade restrictive effects 
similar to the previous quota system. To protect domestic producers, sugar im- 
ports have been reduced from over 3 million metric tons (MMT) in  1980 to 
less than  2 MMT-just  under  15 percent  of  domestic  production-during 
1989-91.  Mexico provided only a small fraction of U.S. imports of sugar and 
sugar-containing  products.  Canada provided  over  one-fourth  of  the sugar- 
containing products that were imported. 
A final group of agricultural commodities is composed of horticultural prod- 
ucts. The bulk of domestic production  is of vegetables for which imports or 
exports accounts for less than  10 percent of production  value. Trade is more 
important for seasonal winter vegetables. For these commodities, imports were 
over 40 percent and exports were almost  10  percent of the value of domestic 
production during 1989-91.  Over 90 percent of the imports came from Mex- 
ico, and over 90 percent of the exports went to Canada. Trade is also relatively 
important for citrus and other winter fruits. Citrus imports are primarily frozen 
concentrated orange juice from Brazil that competes with production in Flor- 
ida. Citrus exports are mostly fresh products from California, with Canada an 
important export market. California fruit and vegetable producers and proces- 
sors have also integrated their operations into Mexico to a greater extent than 
their Florida counterparts. Thus, the horticultural  sector is characterized  by 
divergent commodity, seasonal, and regional interests. 
the section 22 quotas. Peanut exports arise from a two-tier  pricing scheme that  allows sales at 
lower world price levels of U.S.  peanuts beyond a quantity produced for the domestic market. 
2. Domestic production quotas were assigned in 1993 for the first time since Cuban sugar im- 
ports were proscribed after Fidel Castro took power in 1959. Table 7.2  Number of Farms and Distribution of Production by Value of Farm Sales 
Value of Farm Sales 
Less than $50,000  $50,000 to $500,000  More than $500,000 
Number of  Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of 
Farms  Farms  Production  Farms  Production  Farms  Production  Commodity 
Grains and oilseeds 
Livestock and poultry 
Beef cattle excluding feedlots 
Beef cattle feedlots 
Hogs 




Section 22 commodities 
sugar" 
Vegetables and melons 
Fruits and tree nuts 
Other 
Total 














































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census ofAgriculrure  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987). 
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7.1.1  Farm Numbers 
Some characteristics of the different production sectors are summarized in 
table 7.2. Grains and oilseeds were produced on over 400,000 farms and beef 
cattle on over 625,000 farms and ranches.  There  were  over  130,000 dairy 
farms, and just over  100,000 farms produced sugar or field crops other than 
grains and oilseeds. Less than 100,000 farms fattened cattle on feedlots, raised 
hogs, or produced fruits and tree  nuts,  respectively, while less than  50,000 
farms produced poultry and eggs, cotton, or vegetables and melons. 
Of the units counted as farms, almost three-fourths had gross sales of under 
$50,000 and provided less than full-time employment for a farm operator. This 
type of farm produced less than 10 percent of the total value of output except 
in the cases of grains and oilseeds, beef cattle (excluding feedlots), and sugar 
and other field crops. In contrast, less than 2 percent of all farms had sales of 
$500,000 and above. The farms in this  sales class produced from 40  to 90 
percent of the beef cattle on feedlots, poultry and eggs, sugar and other field 
crops, vegetables and melons, and fruits and tree nuts. 
7.1.2  Levels of Support and Protection 
There are differences among the sectors in terms of the  level of  support 
provided through domestic farm programs and the protection provided by trade 
policies. Producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs), shown in the first two columns 
of table 7.3, estimate the percentage of farm income derived from a wide range 
of policy interventions, including price policies, direct payments, trade barri- 
ers, and insurance, credit, tax, and other input and processing subsidies. An- 
nual  PSEs  have  been  calculated  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) and USDA since the early 1980s. These 
estimates have  been  utilized  as a basis  for  comparing  agricultural policies 
among  countries  during  negotiations  of  the  GATT  Uruguay  Round,  the 
Canada-U.S. FTA, and NAFTA. 
The levels of protection provided to various commodities by tariffs and other 
border policies are also reported in table 7.3. The tariff rates in effect at the 
beginning of the NAFTA negotiations are shown in the third column. Estimates 
of  the differences between domestic and world prices induced by  tariffs and 
quantitative border restrictions are shown in the fourth column. 
The PSEs and protection measures in table 7.3 show that U.S.  policy inter- 
ventions provide high levels of support for some export crops as well as for the 
commodities protected historically by import quotas. Support for export crops 
is provided primarily through acreage-reduction-based supply restrictions, di- 
rect payments to producers that supplement market returns, and floor prices 
(“loan rates”) at which farmers can place their output in storage and receive a 
loan from the government. Wheat producers also benefit particularly from ex- 
port subsidies. The PSEs have been higher for wheat, barley, and rice than for 
corn, oats, sorghum, and soybeans. Tariff levels are relatively low for all of the 




(% of domestic  Border Protection 
prices)  (% of international prices) 
Tariff 
1982-9  I  1991  1991 Tariffsa  Equivalentsb 











Other edible oils 
Livestock and poultry 
Beef and veal 
Pork 
Poultry 













Orange juice (frozen 

































































































Sources: PSEs are from USDA (1994); 1991 tariffs are from USDA (1992a); estimates of tariff 
equivalents of border protection are from Sanderson (1994) except for dairy products, cotton, and 
shelled and unshelled peanuts, which are from USDA (1992b). 
Note: (-)  Not available. 
*Many  tariffs are expressed at fixed rates, so ad valorem estimates vary with commodity prices. 
bEstimated differences between domestic and world prices induced by various border restrictions. 
?Tariffhate quota (limited imports at low duty and prohibitive tariff for additional quantities). 344  David Orden 
support through direct payments. 
For the import-quota or TRQ-protected commodities dairy, peanuts, and 
sugar, large distortions favoring domestic producers have been created by  the 
import restrictions, as shown by the estimated tariff equivalents of these bani- 
ers. Cotton producers, while protected by section 22 quotas, also receive direct 
payments, and U.S.  prices are usually near world levels. 
In contrast to the section 22 commodities or the principal grains and oil- 
seeds, fruits and vegetables have not been subject to import quotas, and pro- 
ducers have received few direct support payments (PSEs are not available for 
fruits and vegetables). In general, producers of fruits and vegetables receive 
relatively low levels of  protection from tariffs, but there are a few exceptions. 
The support and protection levels have also been relatively low for livestock 
and poultry. The estimated tariff equivalent for beef  (31.1 percent) suggests 
that meat import restrictions have had more effect than indicated by  the esti- 
mated PSEs but have been less severe than for the section 22 commodities. 
The policy interventions in U.S. agriculture and the levels of  support and 
protection provided to different commodities are the cumulative result of con- 
voluted economic and political forces. In an  empirical assessment, Gardner 
(1987), for example, found that support (measured similarly to the PSEs by 
the producer price gains resulting from farm programs) increased systemati- 
cally across commodities when elasticities of supply and demand were low, a 
larger share of output was imported or exported, and the lagged level of total 
farm income declined relative to nonfarm income. Given these determinants 
of  support, factors that facilitated political organization by a sector also were 
significant. There was a nonlinear relationship between the number of produc- 
ers of  a commodity and the level of  support obtained, with less support of 
commodities for which there were either fewer or greater numbers of produc- 
ers. Support also increased with the size of the average unit and with the geo- 
graphic concentration of production and stability of its location over time. 
Observations based  on  tables  7.1-7.3  corroborate  several  of  Gardner’s 
hypotheses and suggest a few others (see also Swinnen and van der Zee 1993, 
and the references therein). Most commodities produced domestically are pro- 
tected from import competition. Among the exported commodities, levels of 
support are positively correlated with  the degree of  export dependence, al- 
though the direction of causality remains open to question. The high levels of 
support obtained by wheat and barley producers may be explained by the lack 
of alternative production opportunities (inelastic supply) in the dryer parts of 
the midwestern grain belt where these commodities are produced. Grains gen- 
erally receive more support than oilseeds even though they are often grown on 
the same farms. This is a historical consequence of the origins of the support 
programs in the Depression-era policies of the New Deal when soybeans were 
not grown as a livestock feed on a commercial basis. 
Among the factors affecting the relative demands for support and protection, 
the levels of intervention are higher for the moderate number of farms produc- 345  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
ing grains or dairy than for either the large number of  farms producing beef 
cattle or the relatively small number producing cattle on feedlots, poultry and 
eggs, cotton, or vegetables and melons. The extent of  processing associated 
with the products from a sector also might be hypothesized to be related to the 
levels of support and protection. But dairy, sugar, and peanuts obtain high lev- 
els of protection and soybeans and beef cattle relatively low levels of  support 
even though the products from each of these sectors requires substantial pro- 
cessing. 
7.2  Interest Group Approaches to the Negotiations 
Agricultural interests are represented both by general-membership  organiza- 
tions  and  by  numerous commodity-based associations. The approaches of 
these various groups to the NAFTA negotiations were affected by  specific as- 
pects of bilateral trade with Mexico and Canada and the levels of support and 
protection received by producers, described above, and by their perceptions of 
NAFTA's  relationship to other bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. A 
chronology of relevant events is shown in table 7.4. 
When  the  Mexico-U.S.  free trade  negotiations were jointly  announced, 
Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and President Bush articulated a 
Table 7.4  Chronology of NAFTA 
Early 1980s 

















Free trade agreements with Israel, Canada, and Mexico contemplated by the 
Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement approved by Congress 
Ministerial declaration launched the Uruguay Round GA'R negotiations 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement approved by Congress 
Midterm agreement reached for UrUgUaY Round negotiations on agriculture 
President Bush and President Salinas issued a joint statement in support of 
Canada officially joined the trade negotiations with Mexico and the United 
NAFTA negotiations initiated 
NAFTA negotiations concluded 
President Bush announced to Congress his intent to sign the agreement 
Presidential candidate Clinton announced his support for NAFTA if 
Reagan administration 
negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement 
States 
supplemental (side) agreements were negotiated to address issues of the 
environment, labor, and import surges 
Leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed NAFTA in their 
respective capitals 
Negotiations on side-agreements initiated 
Negotiations on side-agreements concluded 
President Clinton signed the side-agreements and began an intense campaign 
for passage of the implementing legislation 
NAFTA legislation approved by Congress 
Uruguay Round GATT negotiations concluded 
NAFTA went into effect 346  David Orden 
broad mandate for reducing trade barriers and supporting Mexican reforms in 
agriculture and other sectors. In particular, bilateral trade had been affected by 
the high levels of protection that Mexican agriculture had received in the mid- 
1980s: PSEs had averaged 47.6 percent among 14 major commodities (USDA 
1994). Under reforms initiated by the administration of President Salinas, the 
average Mexican PSE had declined to 19.9 percent by  1990. Concurrently, the 
value of  U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico increased from $1.2 billion to 
$2.5 billion. 
The growth of agricultural exports stimulated commodity group interest in 
the United States in further development of  trade opportunities. Even so, and 
despite the reforms initiated by the Salinas administration, the high levels of 
protection traditionally  provided to many commodities in both countries cre- 
ated considerable uncertainty about the extent to which agriculture would be 
included under the mandate for Mexico-U.S. trade liberalization. 
The uncertainty  about agriculture increased when  Canada joined Mexico 
and the United States in seeking a trilateral agreement. Nontariff  agricultural 
trade bamers had not been addressed in the previous Canada-U.S. FTA (see, 
e.g., Miner  1993). Import restrictions were retained by Canada to protect its 
dairy and poultry sectors, which benefited in 1991 from PSEs of 67.0 and 35.0 
percent, respectively, and by  the United States for dairy, cotton, peanuts, and 
sugar.  Although  both  the  Canadian  and  the  U.S.  wheat  producers  sought 
agreements to bar unfair domestic and export subsidies, because of differences 
in their support and marketing systems finding mutually acceptable definitions 
remained elusive for these highly  subsidized and export-dependent competi- 
tors. Canada retained import licensing authority for grains unless U.S. PSEs 
fell below Canadian levels, and little progress was made on mutual commit- 
ments to develop rules governing subsidies. Both countries retained the right 
to reintroduce either quotas or tariffs  on grains if  “imports increase signifi- 
cantly as a result of a substantial change in either Party’s support programs.” 
There was also uncertainty with respect to NAFTA’s agricultural provisions 
because the negotiations  took place against the backdrop of as yet undeter- 
mined outcomes of the multilateral GATT negotiations. The United States had 
originally proposed a comprehensive “zero option” in GATT calling for the 
elimination of essentially all trade-distorting border measures and domestic 
support payments by its members. The zero-option proposal had proved unten- 
able by the midterm GATT review in 1988. By the beginning of the NAFTA 
negotiations,  the GATT discussions were focused on more restricted  provis- 
ions for capping domestic support levels, partial reduction of export subsidies, 
and tariffication of import quotas, licenses, and other nontariff restrictions on 
trade. The nontariff restrictions were to be replaced by minimal market access 
provided by TRQs and high initial over-quota tariff levels, as in the case of 
U.S. sugar imports, with the over-quota tariffs subject to only modest reduc- 
tions over time. 
Faced with all this uncertainty  about likely outcomes, the various agricul- 347  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
tural interest groups took active roles in seeking to shape the NAFTA negotia- 
tions. They became aligned along two broad positions:  those favoring their 
inclusion under provisions  for agricultural trade liberalization and those fa- 
voring limits on the scope of the agreement with retention of some of the tradi- 
tional trade restrictions. The basic positions  of  a selected subset of the most 
active agricultural and agriprocessing industry groups are shown in table 7.5. 
7.2.1  Proponents of Liberalization 
The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) is the largest of the general- 
membership organizations and is oriented toward competitive markets. At the 
outset of the NAFTA negotiations,  the AFBF commissioned  a study of  the 
potential impacts on domestic agriculture of reduced trade barriers with Mex- 
ico. This study showed generally positive effects and provided the basis for the 
AFBF’s approach to the negotiations.  Although the study  was criticized by 
some farm groups for minimizing the potential impacts on sectors that might 
face increased import competition, the AFBF concluded it would support com- 
prehensive  liberalization  that  included  even  the  most  politically  sensitive 
import-competing commodities. The AFBF sought an active role in the negoti- 
ations, based partly on a view that it had not been vocal enough during negotia- 
tions for the Canada-U.S. FTA. 
Table 7.5  Selected Agricultural Interest Groups 
Favoring Liberalization  Favoring Limits to the Agreement 
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) 
National Grange 
American Soybean Association 
National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) 
U.S. Feed Grains Council 
National Cattlemen’s Association (NCA) 
National Pork Producers Council 
National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) 
Agribusiness Council, Inc. 
Sweetener Users Association (SUA) 
Food Marketing Institute 
National Farmers’ Union (NFU) 
American Corn Growers Association (ACGA) 
National Association of Wheat Growers 
National Peanut Council of America 
Southwest Peanut Growers 
Florida Sugar Cane League 
US. Beet Sugar Association 
Florida Citrus Mutual 
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association 
Western Growers 
United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL- 
(NAWG) 
CIO 
Note: Representatives of the 22 groups listed were interviewed about their NAFTA position and 
activities during August-October 1993. The classification shown is based on the author’s judg- 
ments from the content of the interviews and does not necessarily represent the legal or otherwise 
official positions of the groups. Interviewees were selected from a sample of 37 farm groups and 
15 processing industry groups with representatives in the Washington, D.C., area. In  addition, 
representatives of Florida Citrus Mutual and the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association were 
interviewed at their state offices. The initial sample of groups was identified from the membership 
of USTR’s Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee and 10 agricultural technical advisory com- 
mittees and from respondents to a survey about NAFTA sent to 300 groups and individuals by the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. 348  David Orden 
Many of the grain and oilseed commodity associations joined the AFBF in 
support for eliminating trade barriers under NAFTA. For these commodities, 
the 1987-90  export trend was interpreted to imply that reduced protection and 
increased  income growth in Mexico would provide market opportunities. In 
particular, increased exports of U.S. corn and other feed grains were expected 
if Mexico further reduced its traditional support programs and trade restric- 
tions. The National Corn Growers Association  (NCGA), the largest organiza- 
tion of corn producers and processors (with about 25,000 members), became 
an active supporter of NAFTA. The NCGA sought maximum opening of the 
Mexican market. It requested an initial TRQ for corn of 3.5 MMT, which was 
considered a level “tough for Mexico to grant.” The NCGA expected further 
gains in derived demand for corn from a growing Mexican  market for U.S. 
livestock products. 
Livestock producers concurred in anticipating gains from liberalized trade 
with Mexico. The approach toward the negotiations of the National Cattlemen’s 
Association (NCA) was representative of their efforts. The NCA was interested 
in expanding foreign market access and cited as a successful precedent  the 
1988 bilateral agreement to replace Japanese beef quotas with TRQs and de- 
clining over-quota  tariff levels. Mexico did not have import quotas on beef 
when the NAFTA negotiations were initiated, but there was uncertainty about 
continued openness of the border and the levels at which tariffs on livestock 
products would be set. 
The corn growers and cattlemen, among others, were actively engaged in 
the NAFTA negotiations. The NCGA had extensive discussions of goals and 
strategy in meetings of their voting delegates, stayed in close contact with the 
senior negotiators, and kept their supporters in Congress informed about the 
process. The NCGA was represented on the Grains and Feed Technical Advi- 
sory Committee of  the United States trade representative  (USTR), one of  10 
agricultural  technical  advisory  committees  (ATACs) established  as part  of 
USTR’s private sector advisory structure by the Trade Act of 1974.3  The NCA 
worked closely with the broader Meat Industry Trade Policy Council and was 
represented on USTR’s Livestock and Livestock Products Technical Advisory 
Committee,  its  multicommodity  Agricultural  Policy  Advisory  Committee, 
and  its  president’s Advisory  Committee  on Trade  Policy  and Negotiations 
(ACTPN). Representatives of the NCA concluded that they had ample oppor- 
tunities to influence the outcome of the negotiations through regular interaction 
with USDA and USTR and through Congress. 
3. The presidentially appointed private sector advisory system is arranged in three tiers: the 
president’s  Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations; seven policy advisory commit- 
tees (Services, Investment, and Intergovernmental, managed solely by USTR, and Industry, Agri- 
culture, Labor, and Defense, managed jointly with other agencies); and more than 30 technical, 
sectoral, and functional advisory committees. The 10 agricultural technical advisory committees 
(ATACs) address cotton, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, grains and feed, livestock and live- 
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Support for an agreement to liberalize agricultural trade also came from 
representatives of many processing and supply industries. Typical of the indus- 
try organizations was the Sweetener Users Association (SUA), sponsored by 
16 major food processors. While recognizing that the sweetener users had little 
influence on the agricultural committees of Congress, an SUA representative 
and  two  other user-industry representatives  served on  USTR’s  Sweeteners 
Technical Advisory Committee. Other processing industries were represented 
on  commodity-specific technical advisory committees (oilseeds, dairy, and 
cotton) and on the separate Processed Foods Technical Advisory Committee. 
Representatives of the dairy industry were also marginally among the sup- 
porters of eliminating trade barriers with Mexico and Canada. Although pro- 
tected by import quotas, the dairy industry had initiated a broad lobbying effort 
to obtain legislative authority for industry-funded export subsidies-called 
their “self-help” legislation. Industry statements suggested this was viewed as 
a means to reduce domestic supply and obtain higher domestic prices by  ex- 
ploiting an inelastic domestic demand (Ban 1993). Since Mexico produced 
few import-competing dairy products and accounted for a large fraction of 
U.S. dairy exports, as shown in table 7.1, greater market access under NAFTA 
was consistent with the industry’s overall initiative. The industry also believed 
that it could be competitive in Canada if  dairy trade restrictions were elimi- 
nated. 
Throughout the NAFTA negotiations, a coalition of dairy cooperatives, rep- 
resented by  the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), remained non- 
committal but not opposed to NAFTA. While supporting expanded export op- 
portunities, the NMPF argued against tariffication of  U.S. section 22  dairy 
quotas, especially if  Canada maintained its import barriers. The NMPF was 
represented on the Dairy Technical Advisory Committee and worked closely 
with USDA and USTR at the staff and policy levels to develop strong rules of 
origin in the event U.S. quotas for Mexico were eliminated on a bilateral basis. 
Representatives of NMPF also “wrote the obligatory letters” and participated 
in congressional hearings. Otherwise, they spent “almost no time on the Hill” 
because they felt the congressional agricultural committees were less inter- 
ested in dairy issues than issues concerning peanuts and sugar. 
7.2.2  Proponents of Limits on the Agreement 
Among the groups that were opposed to the NAFTA negotiations or sought 
limits on the scope of any agreement, the National Farmers Union (NFU), a 
general organization with membership concentrated in the upper midwestern 
states, and several other small general-membership organizations had long ar- 
gued for policies to raise prices for farm products through restrictive supply 
management. Because of  NFU’s  support of  supply management rather than 
export-based market expansion, its representatives viewed themselves as “not 
being allowed at the table” and, likewise, as not having been interested in nego- 
tiating details of  a trade agreement. The NFU, which claims to represent the 350  David Orden 
traditional family farmer against agribusiness interests, sought intensive con- 
gressional involvement, arguing that the Congress would “give the left out enti- 
ties a chance to have their say.” 
The NFU view of the negotiations was shared by the American Corn Grow- 
ers Association (ACGA). The ACGA, with 10,000 members, also seeks higher 
domestic corn prices through restrictive supply management. It traced its ori- 
gins to a split with the NCGA over endorsing lower corn loan rates in 1985 as 
a  means  to  increase  international  competiti~eness.~  The  ACGA  opposed 
NAFTA and was not interested in participating in the negotiations for specific 
provisions. 
Wheat producers also took  a contentious approach toward NAFTA. They 
raised concerns  that U.S.  competitiveness  was being  adversely  affected by 
nontransparency of the pricing policies of the Canadian Wheat Board-the 
exclusive agent for Canadian wheat exports-and  by eastbound grain transpor- 
tation subsidies in Canada. These were among the issues left unresolved under 
the Canada-U.S. FTA. The U.S. producers argued that increased Canadian ex- 
ports of wheat into the United States and Mexico after  1988 (capturing of a 
large share of the Mexican wheat market) were the result of Canadian export 
subsidies. The Canadian producers counterargued that their export shipments 
resulted from the price differentials and U.S. shipment patterns resulting from 
the United States’ own wheat export enhancement (subsidy) program. 
To  address  their  concerns,  the  National  Association  of  Wheat  Growers 
(NAWG) sought elimination of Canadian subsidies and imposition of  import 
restrictions (wheat had been subject to section 22 quotas that were allowed to 
lapse in  1974 when world wheat prices and U.S. exports rose sharply). The 
wheat producers, unlike the NFU and ACGA, actively engaged in the NAFTA 
negotiating process to press their case. The NAWG kept its members “highly 
informed” of its objectives, participated in hearings of the agricultural commit- 
tees of Congress, worked through contacts at USDA and USTR, and brought 
what its representatives termed “collaborative input from Congress” to bear on 
the negotiators. A NAWG representative  served on USTR’s Grains and Feed 
Technical Advisory Committee but viewed the committee as having little in- 
fluence. 
Limits on the access to U.S. markets provided by NAFTA were also sought 
by representatives  of the cane and beet sugar industries and the commodities 
protected by import quotas. These sectors shared two concerns at the outset of 
the negotiations: that elimination of the trade restrictions with Mexico would 
create potential competition from Mexican producers, and that it would set a 
precedent for further weakening of protective quota restrictions either in subse- 
4. With the high value of  the U.S. dollar in the mid-1980s. world corn prices were resting on 
the US.  loan rate and US.  exports had declined markedly. Lowering the  loan rate under these 
circumstances lowered domestic market prices, to which the ACGA objected, but also reduced the 
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quent negotiations or by  subjecting the remaining restrictions  to legal chal- 
lenge (Gillon 1992). 
With their mutual concerns, a strong coalition might be expected to have 
developed among the protected sectors. However, the views of the dairy indus- 
try were tempered by its recognition of the limited competition and potential 
export opportunities that NAFTA might create, as described above. Cotton pro- 
ducers and processors, represented by the National Cotton Council of America 
(NCCA), also tempered their position. They recognized that expanded export 
opportunities might arise if a North American free trade area for textiles and 
apparel was associated with strong rules of origin for the fiber content of the 
final products-industry  perceptions that mirrored the argument made against 
the trade diversionary effects of such rules of origin by Krueger (1993). 
The moderated  views of the dairy and cotton producers  (assuming there 
were strong rules of origin) left producers of  peanuts and sugar as the most 
strident proponents of limits on NAFTA’s market access provisions. Although 
Mexico was a net peanut importer, the U.S. producers expressed intense oppo- 
sition to possible import competition, partly on the basis of ostensible concern 
about illegal transshipments through Mexico of non-NAFTA peanuts from the 
Caribbean and elsewhere if quotas were removed on a bilateral basis. The pea- 
nut producers, represented primarily by nine state organizations, pressed their 
case through USTR’s Oilseed and Products Technical Advisory Committee and 
through Congress. The producers argued that their concerns were exacerbated 
because consideration of NAFTA came after several years of what they termed 
“extreme uncertainty” about the effects a GATT agreement could have on the 
peanut support program by increasing foreign access to their domestic market. 
The sugar sector’s similar view of liberalized trade under NAFTA as a threat 
to their interests came in response to an initial Mexican request for access to 
the U.S. market of a sugar TRQ of 1.5 MMT-more  than the combined TRQs 
of  all other countries. The U.S. producers claimed they had been assured by 
the Bush administration that the traditional pattern of  trade-with  Mexico a 
net importer of sugar-would  not be disrupted by  NAFTA. In this context, 
they viewed the Mexican access request  as a “shot out of the barrel.” This 
volume of exports was considered possible if Mexican production and refining 
were modernized and if  a shift in relative prices between corn and sugar re- 
sulted in the use of corn sweeteners in the Mexican soft drink industry. 
The sugar producers took a strong stand in defense of their protected domes- 
tic market during the NAFTA negotiations. They opposed any trade liberaliza- 
tion that would put pressure on the U.S. sugar support program. Illustrative of 
their potent avenues of influence was the appointment to USTR’s Agricultural 
Policy Advisory  Committee of  the  executive vice-president  of  the  Florida 
Sugar Cane League, representing one of the major sugar-producing states. This 
appointment came after intensive pressure on the Bush administration by mem- 
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Representatives of  some commodities in  the horticultural sector also ex- 
pressed strong reservations about trade liberalization with Mexico. The USTR’s 
Fruits and Vegetables Technical Advisory Committee became a forum for dis- 
cussing the positions of the diverse interest groups within this sector. An early 
statement in September 1990 cited concerns about increased import competi- 
tion and called for adequate transition periods for tariff reductions (Fruits and 
Vegetables Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee 1990). It noted that 
price-based tariff snapbacks to protect Canadian farmers against import surges 
that depressed domestic prices had been included in the Canada-U.S. FTA  and 
called for similar provisions in NAFTA to protect U.S. farmers. Florida vegeta- 
ble producers also sought exemptions from the agreement until disparities in 
environmental and labor conditions were eliminated, a stance not supported by 
the producers and processors in California. 
Florida citrus producers, represented on USTR’s Processed Foods Technical 
Advisory Committee, were one of the most active groups to oppose NAFTA, 
arguing they  would be “one of  the losers” from an agreement with Mexico. 
The Florida citrus producers initially proposed that orange juice be excluded 
from the agreement for 20 years. Their proposal would have maintained ex- 
isting protection for the productive life of the extensive new plantings that took 
place in southern Florida after severe freezes in the 1980s. 
With  the import-competing Florida producers of  citrus and other winter 
fruits and vegetables joining the sugar sector in opposition to NAFTA, a strong 
coalition emerged to press the CT,~  of Florida agriculture. These interests de- 
veloped a unified position with other agricultural groups. The Florida Farm 
Bureau and the Florida Cattlemen’s Association joined the coalition, and both 
eventually broke ranks with their national organizations’ support for NAFTA. 
The state commissioner of agriculture became an active proponent of the Flor- 
ida concerns, and the producers received endorsements from the state legisla- 
ture and elsewhere. Together, the agricultural groups exerted a powerful influ- 
ence  on  Florida’s large congressional delegation, whose  cooperation  they 
judged to be “superb.” 
7.2.3  Measuring the Activity Levels 
Both proponents of  liberalization of  agricultural trade and proponents of 
limits on the scope of the agreement were actively engaged in asserting their 
positions during the NAFTA negotiations. Avenues for influence ranged from 
individual contacts with USDA and USTR at the staff and policy levels, to 
participation in USTR’s 10 ATACs and its Agricultural Policy Advisory Com- 
mittee, to intervention by  members of the agricultural committees of Congress 
or other individual members, to direct interactions with the president. Specific 
groups were often engaged in the process through a variety of channels, but a 
reasonable generalization is that groups that found the broad outline of  the 
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negotiators and their technical staffs, while groups opposed to the general di- 
rection of the negotiations sought redress through Congress. 
One quantitative  indicator of  the  levels of  interest in NAFTA among the 
various agricultural sectors comes from the information about the agreement 
provided by publications aimed at their different constituents. A summary of 
articles about NAFTA in 30 general and commodity-specific agricultural mag- 
azines is presented in table 7.6. The sample period covers the original negotia- 
tions, the change in administration after the 1992 elections, and the initial dis- 
cussions of the side-agreements negotiated by the Clinton administration. 
Using the average number of articles about NAFTA per issue of a magazine 
as a measure of  intensity of attention, the highest average was found for the 
magazines in the sugar sector (1.08), followed by  grains and oilseeds (0.80), 
and horticulture (0.48).  General farm magazines and the magazines in the dairy 
and peanut sectors show somewhat lower averages (<0.30), and the lowest 
average (0.11) was found for livestock and poultry publications. 
Based on a qualitative content assessment, the articles were also classified 
Table 7.6  Coverage of NAFTA during the Negotiations: Selected Sample of 
Farm Magazines 
Number of  ’Qpe of Article 
Articles  Articles  Analysis or Opinion 
on  Per 












7  193  52  0.27  16  19 
3  108  87  0.80  38  12 
6  184  21  0.11  42 
2  49  14  0.28  83 
3  56  15  0.27  73 
2  26  28  1.08  96 
7  185  88  0.48  21  16 

















Note; Selection was based on a search at the National Agricultural Library and the Carroll M. 
Newman Library at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The subset of magazines 
included in  the review are (1) general:  Farm  Journal, Kiplinger’s Agricultural  Letters,  Ohio 
Farmer; Progressive Farmer; Sourheast Farm Press, Successful Farmer; Top Producer; (2) grains 
and oilseeds: Feedstuffs, Soybean Digest, Wheat Grower; (3) livestock and poultry: Drover’s Jour- 
nal, Inside Beef Today, Meat and Poultry, Pigs Monthly, Sheep Breeder Highlights, World Poultry; 
(4)  dairy: Dairymen’s Digest, Hoard k  Dairymen;  (5)  peanuts:  Peanut Farmer; Peanut  Grower; 
Virginia-Carolina Peanut News; (6) sugar: Cane Press, Sugar Beet Grower; (7) horticulture: Amer- 
ican Fruit Grower; American  Vegetable Grower; California Growec California Tomato Grower; 
Citrus and Vegetable Magazine, Spudletter; Virginia Fruit. The sample period is generally August 
1990 to May 1993, but in 11 cases a somewhat shorter sample was dictated by  availability. 354  David Orden 
as being either reports of  news or presentations of  analysis or opinion. The 
latter articles were divided among those that presented factual material without 
either explicit support or opposition to the agreement, those that were support- 
ive of the agreement, and those in which opposition was expressed. Magazines 
in the sugar sector not only showed the highest intensity level but the articles 
were primarily expressions of  opposition. Articles in the grains and oilseeds 
and horticulture magazines were split more evenly among news reports, analy- 
sis, and differing opinions. Largely factual coverage of NAFTA was presented 
in the general farm magazines, while articles in the small sample of dairy and 
peanut magazines were evenly divided between news and analysis or opinion, 
with a generally supportive position in the dairy magazines and opposition in 
the peanut magazines. 
A second quantitative measure of  the involvement of  the various  interest 
groups in the NAFTA negotiations is provided by their testimony before con- 
gressional committees. There were  13 hearings at which agricultural groups 
were represented during the negotiations for the initial-agreement and the sub- 
sequent side-agreements (three each by committees or subcommittees on agri- 
culture, energy, and commerce, and ways and means, and one each by  foreign 
affairs, public works, small business, and education and labor). 
Testimony at the various hearings reflected the diverse views of the general- 
membership and commodity-specific agricultural groups. Of 20 appearances 
by  general-membership organizations, the AFBF and NFU were represented 
three times each, with remaining testimonies from a variety of  other groups. 
Supporters of trade liberalization from the grains and oilseeds sector testified 
12 times, the NAWG had three opportunities to raise its concerns about Cana- 
dian policies, and the ACGA testified once against the agreement. Livestock 
and poultry producers testified four times in support of the agreement. Dairy 
and cotton groups were also represented four times each, and peanut interests 
testified two times. Sugar producers testified eight times, while the industrial 
sweetener users testified only once. The horticultural sector was represented in 
44 testimonies. The Florida coalition was represented six times by  vegetable 
groups, four times by the state commissioner of agriculture, and twice by the 
citrus  association.  California  and  other  western  and  Mexican  horticultural 
groups were represented 26 times in the hearings. 
A third basis for assessing the levels of activity among the various agricul- 
tural interest groups comes from informal observations of the negotiators and 
commodity group representatives.  One key  negotiator indicated that despite 
the efforts of the AFBF and other supporters, there was not a forceful lobby 
for comprehensive trade liberalization during the negotiations. Negotiators on 
both sides frequently cited keeping defensive domestic interests “on board” as 
their most difficult task, and many participants in the process acknowledged 
that established interests that feared losses were better organized than the po- 
tential beneficiaries of greater international trade. As one observer put it, “there 
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export opportunities into Mexico,” or, as several participants noted, nothing 
motivated a commodity group like “getting its ox gored.” 
7.3  Agricultural Provisions of NAFTA 
Against the backdrop of the various producer interests, high-level negotia- 
tors for Mexico and the United States agreed in February 1992 that all agricul- 
tural products would be included in the long-run provisions for trade liberaliza- 
tion. The U.S.  agricultural groups may have exerted some influence on this 
decision, but informally the U.S. negotiators attributed it largely to the willing- 
ness of Mexico to include its politically  sensitive corn  sector, leaving  little 
room for other exclusions. Canada continued to object to full coverage of the 
agricultural provisions, and the U.S. farm groups and others favoring liberal- 
ized trade were unable to exert sufficient influence for their negotiators to ex- 
tract Canadian concessions. Instead, the negotiators agreed that pending modi- 
fication by a GATT agreement, the Canada-U.S. FTA was to remain in effect 
for bilateral Canada-US. agricultural trade and a similar bilateral  agreement 
on agricultural tariffs and market access would be developed between Mexico 
and Canada. 
Agreements on the provisions of NAFTA were announced by the negotiat- 
ing parties in August 1992. For Mexico and the United States, the agricultural 
tariff and market access provisions called for all quotas and licenses to be con- 
verted to TRQs upon enactment. For imports above the TRQs, over-quota tar- 
iffs were set to provide initial protection equivalent to the previous nontariff 
measures. The over-quota tariffs were to be completely phased out over adjust- 
ment periods of 10 or, in some cases, 15 years. Almost 21 percent of the value 
of  pre-NAFTA trade received  this type of  adjustment mechanism. An addi- 
tional 23 percent of the value of pre-NAFTA trade was subject to straightfor- 
ward phasing out of tariffs over 5 to  15 years, while about 56 percent of the 
value of bilateral  trade occurring under the pre-NAFTA restrictions already 
was, or was scheduled under NAFTA to immediately become, duty free. 
In addition to its market access and tariff provisions, NAFTA addressed is- 
sues concerning grades and standards and sanitary and phytosanitary regula- 
tions related to human, animal, and plant health. Trade restrictions arising in 
these areas had traditionally been problematic, and the agreement enunciated 
principles intended to reduce these sources of friction. The principles included 
that grades and standards be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. Each coun- 
try also retained the right to maintain its own health and safety standards as 
long as they were “scientifically  based  and administered in a forthright and 
expeditious manner.” Detailed dispute settlement procedures were established 
in an effort to provide a forum for resolution of conflicts among the parties. 
While placing  no  restrictions  on  domestic  support  levels,  the  long-run 
NAFTA provisions for agriculture accomplished on a bilateral basis the basic 
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proposal. This was a notable achievement in comparison to previous bilateral 
efforts to liberalize trade of  agricultural products, which had not addressed 
quantitative restrictions, or the then-pending Uruguay Round GATT negotia- 
tions, in which tariffication of quotas and licenses was being considered with 
only minimal requirements for market access and reduction of  the levels of 
over-quota  tariffs  over  time.  The NAFTA  result  led  Hufbauer  and  Schott 
( 1993) to conclude, for example, that there was “laudable progress in the liber- 
alization of farm trade barriers.” In their widely cited evaluation, they assigned 
an “A”  grade to the outcomes of  the negotiations for agriculture, one of  the 
four highest grades assigned among 18 aspects of the agreement. Similarly, a 
key  U.S.  agricultural negotiator expressed the  exuberant view  that NAFTA 
would create “the freest trade in agricultural products between any two coun- 
tries.”  Other  anecdotal  evidence  also  supports  a  sense  of  accomplishment 
among the negotiators. 
One cannot be as sanguine about the short-run NAFTA provisions for agri- 
culture. For the commodities protected by import quotas or licenses, market 
access under the initial TRQs was based on 1989-91  trade levels. Quantities 
receiving market access under the TRQs were scheduled to increase at only a 
3 percent annual compound rate.  Over-quota tariffs  provided  high levels of 
protection against additional imports in the short and medium run. Proposed 
initial Mexican over-quota tariffs were 215 percent for corn and 260 percent 
for chicken, for example, while proposed U.S. over-quota tariffs were 70 per- 
cent for cheeses and 123 percent for shelled peanuts. Corn, dry edible beans, 
milk powder, and peanuts were considered particularly sensitive commodities 
and received 15-year adjustment periods for phase-out of the over-quota tariffs. 
More complex protective TRQ transition mechanisms were negotiated  for 
sugar. Mexico agreed to raise its external sugar tariff to the U.S. over-quota 
level by the seventh year of the agreement. Mexican access to the U.S. sugar 
market was restricted by a TRQ of 25,000 metric tons during this period, with 
the over-quota tariff between Mexico and the United States phased out over 15 
years. Mexico gained increased low-duty access to the U.S. market after seven 
years if  it became a surplus sugar region based on domestic production and 
consumption,  with  unlimited access for its surpluses if  it became  a surplus 
producer for two consecutive years. The negotiators did not address the ques- 
tion of whether the United States would maintain its aggregate global TRQ for 
sugar, in which case any Mexican surpluses would divert trade from other for- 
eign suppliers, or whether U.S. commitments to other countries would be hon- 
ored, in which case the Mexican surpluses would put downward pressure on 
U.S. production and prices. 
A complex TRQ was also negotiated for frozen concentrated orange juice, 
which had been  subject previously  only to tariff barriers.  The within-quota 
imports  were  assessed  a tariff  of  one-half  the  most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
level. The over-quota tariffs were set initially at MFN rates, then declined lin- 357  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
early by  15 percent during the first six years, remained constant for four years, 
and were phased out over an additional five years. 
Two  additional adjustment mechanisms were  included  in  the  negotiated 
agreement to address other concerns of  the U.S. producers of  horticultural 
products. First, tariffs on cucumbers, asparagus, broccoli, melons, dried on- 
ions, and garlic were phased out over 15 years instead of  10 years. Second, a 
mechanism named a special safeguard was applied to seasonal U.S.  imports of 
tomatoes, peppers, onions, eggplants, squash, and watermelons. The special 
safeguard commodities were to have TRQs with 10-year periods of adjustment, 
but the over-quota tariffs were held at MFN levels during the adjustment pe- 
riod, then eliminated in one step at the end. 
A final adjustment mechanism was provided by  the emergency action pro- 
visions of the agreement. During the transition periods, a tariff reduction could 
be  suspended and the MFN tariff rate reestablished for up to four years if 
imports were found to have become, or to threaten to become, a substantial 
cause of serious injury to a domestic industry. The investigating authority for 
emergency action decisions for the United States was the International Trade 
Commission (ITC). Emergency actions were limited to a single application for 
any commodity during the transition period. After the transition period had 
expired, such actions could only be applied with the consent of, and compensa- 
tion to, the other party. 
From these brief descriptions of the transition mechanisms for agricultural 
trade, the influence of various producer groups on the negotiations is evident. 
Within the framework of long-run liberalization of trade with Mexico, likely 
gainers among U.S. producers confronted the lengthy adjustment mechanisms 
included to protect Mexican  farmers. Import-competing U.S. commodities 
were provided with similar adjustment protection. Given these provisions, the 
end-constraint of  complete tariff elimination is crucial to the assertion that 
NAFTA accomplished long-run bilateral trade liberalization for agriculture. 
7.4  Estimated Effects of the Agricultural Provisions 
Several quantitative estimates have  been made of  the long-run effects of 
NAFTA  on Mexico-U.S. agricultural trade. The range of  these estimates is 
illustrated in  table 7.7. The results from a model developed by  Grennes and 
Krissoff (1993) with support from USDA are compared to composite assess- 
ments underlying the preliminary (September 1992) and revised (March 1993) 
reports from the secretary of agriculture’s Office of Economics. The latter as- 
sessments were frequently used by  the Bush and Clinton administrations in 
congressional testimony and elsewhere. 
Grennes and  Krissoff developed  a 29-commodity, three-region (Mexico, 
United States, and rest of  world) partial equilibrium model using the Arm- 
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Table 7.7  Estimates of NAFTA's Long-Run Effects on Mexico-U.S. Agricultural 
Trade (million dollars) 
Commodity 
Static Model  Composite Estimates 
(Grennes-Krissoff)  (USDA) 
us.  us.  us.  US. 
Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports 
Grains and oilseeds 
Corn 
Other coarse grains 
Wheat 
Soybeans (includes meal and oil) 





Livestock and poultry 
Poultry 






Orange juice (frozen concentrate) 



























































































Sources:  Grennes and Krissoff (1993); USDA (1993); private communication with the authors 
and USDA's Office of Economics. 
Note: (-)  Not available. 
perfect substitutes. An equilibrium  solution estimated under the assumption 
that agricultural trade  barriers between Mexico  and the United  States were 
eliminated was compared to the equilibrium solution obtained incorporating 
price differentials equivalent to the tariffs and nontariff barriers in 1988.  Thus, 
Grennes and Krissoff estimated the long-run impact of NAFTA on annual trade 
flows with technology and national incomes implicitly held constant. 
Consistent  with  the  basic  comparative  advantages  reflected  in  the  pre- 
NAFTA trade flows, the Grennes-Krissoff model showed an increase in U.S. 359  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
grain, oilseed, and livestock exports to Mexico under NAFTA, while Mexico 
increased its exports of horticultural products and live cattle. Agricultural ex- 
ports from the United States to Mexico increased by $485 million annually 
and agricultural imports from Mexico by $164 million. Grennes and Krissoff 
pointed out that appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the Mexican peso 
could reverse the estimated net trade effects, and Grennes (1993) noted that 
the discounted value of the gains from trade were reduced substantially by the 
long transition periods involved. 
In terms of  adjustments within each country, the production  and price of 
corn in Mexico were estimated to decline by 7.3 and 15.9 percent, respectively, 
in  the  Grennes-Krissoff  model,  with  proportional  impacts on  other coarse 
grains. The impacts on U.S. grain and oilseed production and prices were posi- 
tive but negligible. Effects on the livestock sector were also relatively larger in 
Mexico than in the United States. Grennes and Krissoff did not model a shift 
from sugar to corn sweeteners in the Mexican soft drink industry; thus, they 
found essentially no change in Mexico-US. sugar trade. For the horticultural 
products included in their model, Mexican production expanded while U.S. 
production and prices fell. No horticultural product experienced a production 
or price decrease of more than 2 percent. 
The results from the Grennes-Krissoff model suggest moderate overall bene- 
fits of NAFTA for U.S. agricultural producers. The reports by USDA’s Office 
of Economics asserted a more positive view of NAFTA’s potential beneficial 
impacts. The analysis for these reports was based on a variety of USDA model 
outcomes and analysts’ judgments. It also incorporated estimated demand ef- 
fects resulting from a projected increase in annual economic growth in Mexico 
of 0.5 percent of GDP due to NAFTA. 
The final Office of Economics report concluded that U.S. agricultural ex- 
ports to Mexico were likely to be more than $2.5 billion higher annually with 
NAFTA by the end of the 15-year adjustment period-an  increase five times 
the level estimated by  Grennes and Krissoff-while  imports of  agricultural 
products from Mexico would increase by $500 to $600 million. The difference 
between the export estimates by the Office of Economics and Grennes-Krissoff 
is attributable mostly to greater exports of income-responsive  livestock and 
poultry ($1,508 million compared to $48 million), with somewhat greater ex- 
ports of  grains and oilseeds, dairy products,  and fruits and vegetables. The 
Office of  Economics estimated greater U.S.  imports  of  cattle,  horticultural 
commodities, and other products. 
Among the commodities protected by U.S. import quotas, the Office of Eco- 
nomics concluded that exports of milk powder to Mexico were expected “to 
grow by about 20,000 metric tons by the end of the 15-year transition period,” 
while Mexican exports of dairy products to the United States were unlikely to 
increase. The Office of  Economics concluded that U.S. exports of  both raw 
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NAFTA, and that the United States would “enhance its role as a major supplier 
of peanuts to Mexico,” with“litt1e reason to expect Mexico to become a sig- 
nificant supplier of peanuts.” 
The reports by the Office of Economics also downplayed the possibility  of 
adverse impacts of NAFTA on domestic producers of sugar and winter fruits 
and vegetables. Specific estimates of the value of increased imports were not 
published, but the final report  concluded for sugar that it was “uncertain  to 
what extent Mexico might achieve a net production surplus” and that “any net 
production  surplus would  likely develop gradually because  of  . . . the con- 
straints to switching to corn sweeteners in the Mexican soft drink industry.” 
For winter fruits and vegetables, the Office of Economics concluded that any 
price effects would be moderated by  the  10- and  15-year adjustment periods 
and the special safeguards. The potential increased competition for citrus was 
acknowledged with the qualifier that the effects on the U.S. industry were “ex- 
pected to be small” (U.S. imports “about 3-4  percent higher with NAFTA” 
and U.S. prices “slightly lower”). 
7.5  Interest Group Assessments of the Agreement 
The USTR’s Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (1992) and 10 ATACs 
(1992) completed their legislatively mandated assessments of NAFTA in Sep- 
tember 1992. The Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee generally reflected 
the  position  of  the  AFBF,  concluding  that  it  “believes  that  the  proposed 
NAFTA provides long-term net export growth opportunities for U.S. agricul- 
ture and is in the economic interest of the United States.” 
The commodity groups that had supported bilateral trade liberalization un- 
der the agreement were also mostly  satisfied with the results of the negotia- 
tions. In their ATAC report, the feed grain representatives stated that their mar- 
ket access objectives “had been met.” The oilseed producers and processors 
noted  that the agreement  “will afford the US. industry with a comparative 
advantage in the Mexican market over imports from competing  suppliers in 
South America, Europe and elsewhere.” Livestock (and poultry and egg) pro- 
ducers concluded that  the negotiations were generally successful but called 
attention to the “glaring differences in  state and national veterinary  service 
infrastructure.” They noted the need for “animal health programs to be in place 
in Mexico that will protect the livestock industries of both countries.” Subse- 
quently, the livestock producers expressed renewed concerns when Mexico im- 
posed new tariffs of 15 to 25 percent on livestock and meat products in Novem- 
ber  1992. The NCA saw NAFTA as an opportunity to remove these tariffs and 
the threat of future tariffs. 
Support for the negotiated agricultural provisions of NAFTA was also ex- 
pressed by many food-processing industries. Representatives of the industrial 
sweetener users expressed appreciation for “the manner in which the trade 
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plex negotiations” and strongly supported the agreement. The Processed Foods 
Technical Advisory Committee (except citrus) also supported the agreement 
but pointed out that its acceptance of  tariffication of  section 22 quotas under 
NAFTA was “based solely on the status of productionkonsumption considera- 
tions in the three countries.” Similarly, the Dairy Technical Advisory Commit- 
tee, while noting that the dairy sector opposed tariffication of section 22 quo- 
tas, concluded that the TRQs and rules-of-origin provisions were “sufficient to 
prevent disruptive levels of dairy imports” and that U.S.  dairy producers would 
benefit  if  they  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  export  opportunities 
NAFTA created. 
In contrast to these expressions of support for NAFTA (even with technical 
reservations), many  of  the agricultural groups that had sought limits on  the 
agreement were not satisfied with the negotiated outcomes. The NFU contin- 
ued to express broad opposition to the agreement, and wheat producers ex- 
pressed dissatisfaction that their concerns about Canadian Wheat Board pric- 
ing  and  grain  transportation  subsidies  were  not  addressed.  The  NAWG 
acknowledged that there had been a lot of access to the negotiating process but 
concluded that “whether you  get what you  want is another question.” Their 
ATAC  representative viewed the Republican administration as unresponsive. 
Foreshadowing the bargaining that would occur during the congressional de- 
bate to follow, he recommended that the “important matters (concerning Can- 
ada) be addressed in the implementing legislation.” 
The import-quota-protected sectors other than dairy also continued to ex- 
press opposition to NAFTA. Cotton producers noted their opposition to elimi- 
nation of  section 22 quotas and argued that there were “no reliable estimates 
of  how  traditional cropping patterns will  be  affected by  provisions  of  the 
NAFTA.”  Cotton processors, in  contrast, endorsed the  agreement but  not 
“expansion of NAFTA to include other countries.” 
Peanut producers and shellers remained more unified in their opposition to 
the agreement. They called attention to Canada’s exclusion of “sensitive prod- 
ucts” and concluded that “the U.S. government should have  insisted on the 
same provisions for U.S. Section 22 commodities.” The Washington represen- 
tative of  many  of  the state peanut organizations faulted the U.S. negotiators 
for not attaining this outcome but gave credit to Congressman de la Garza, 
chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, for “taking care” of peanut 
concerns for tough rules of origin “as late as the last day of the negotiations.” 
Sugar producers also remained unified in their opposition to the outcome of 
the NAFTA negotiations. They accused the administration of being out to “get 
sugar” and objected that the negotiations proceeded “in great haste and unprec- 
edented secrecy.” Tivisting the effects of  high domestic sugar prices to their 
own ends, their representatives argued that the sugar sector had gone through 
a difficult rationalization to, as they put it, “modernize the domestic industry.” 
They argued that it would be “unfair” for U.S. producers to bear the burden of 
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similar “modernization” in Mexico (use of  high-fructose corn sweeteners in 
the soft drink industry) and consequent sugar surpluses and exports. The sugar 
producers asserted that they had “no hand” in the provisions that were included 
in the negotiated  agreement  and  called for two fundamental  modifications. 
First, they argued that the Mexican surplus status be calculated “not just on the 
basis of sugar, but on caloric sweeteners, including corn sweeteners.” Second, 
they argued that Mexican access to the U.S. market “be capped at a growing 
TRQ” for the full 15-year adjustment period even if Mexico became a surplus 
producer for two consecutive years. Representatives of  the producers on the 
sweeteners ATAC  also raised concerns about whether NAFTA would be ex- 
tended to other countries. Although not mentioned specifically, these countries 
potentially included Cuba with its annual sugar surpluses in excess of 5 MMT. 
Finally, the horticultural  sector, like the cotton industry, held mixed views 
about the negotiated agreement. Winter fruit and vegetable producers in Flor- 
ida continued to oppose NAFTA. The Florida producers felt they had pursued 
all of  the avenues open to participating in the negotiations and viewed their 
access to the negotiators as good throughout most of the process. In the end, 
however, like the sugar producers, they concluded that the Bush administration 
had “failed to honor its commitment to Congress to provide protection for the 
most  sensitive products.” The Florida producers  suggested again that  some 
winter fruits and vegetables be excluded from the agreement. At a minimum, 
they argued that the tariff phase-out periods be extended to 20 years for sensi- 
tive commodities, with more commodities included in the category subject to 
the longest transition. 
Reactions of other horticultural producers illustrated the diversity of  inter- 
ests within this sector. California producers generally expressed less opposi- 
tion to the agreement than  producers in Florida. The U.S. wine industry, in 
particular, was dissatisfied with the phase-out periods for Mexican tariffs being 
too long. Together with potato producers, who had similar concerns, the wine 
industry concluded it could not support the agreement unless more favorable 
access to the Mexican market were obtained. 
7.5.1 
To complement USTR’s advisory committee reports and other expressions 
of the  views of producers  and other interested parties, Senators Leahy  and 
Lugar, chairman and ranking member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry, conducted a survey of opinions about NAFTA. As had 
been done for previous important policy decisions, the survey was mailed to 
300 groups and individuals identified by the committee staff as having an inter- 
est in the issues. By June  1993, 124 responses were received. The relatively 
low response rate may suggest that the survey was not considered an effective 
means to express an opinion to Congress by many interest groups. Neverthe- 
less, the responses provide a broad overview of the positions of the various 
agricultural interests. 
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Based  on  a qualitative analysis  of  the  responses  (e.g.,  stated position, 
strength of the language, number of  caveats), 24 provided strong support for 
the agreement, 51 provided support, 21 were opposed, 9 were strongly op- 
posed, and  19 took no p~sition.~  Among the general-membership organiza- 
tions, positions remained divided. Several government and public agencies 
submitted letters (with opposition from Florida and support from Arizona, Cal- 
ifornia, and Texas), and the embassies of five Caribbean countries submitted 
an unsolicited letter of opposition because of potential reductions of their sugar 
TRQs. Grain and oilseed producers and some livestock groups were supportive 
of the agreement, but others had reservations or had not taken a position. The 
dairy and cotton respondents were divided between supporters and those not 
having a position, while peanut and sugar producers expressed their strong 
opposition. Respondents among horticultural interests again reflected diverse 
views, with opposition expressed by  the coalition of Florida producers. Food 
processors and suppliers and the forestry industry overwhelmingly supported 
NAFTA, while the United  Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO, ex- 
pressed  organized  labor’s  opposition,  citing  particularly  its  concern  that 
NAFTA  might cause meat-packing jobs to  move  from the United States to 
Mexico. 
One interesting aspect of the letters received by the Senate committee is that 
supporters tended to identify fewer specifics than opponents. There were an 
average of 3.86 and 5.47 comments per letter from those providing strong sup- 
port or support, respectively, compared to 7.41 and 7.88 from those opposed 
and strongly opposed. Supporters also tended to be less focused on their per- 
ceptions of  benefits than opponents were on their concerns. Among respon- 
dents providing strong support, an average of almost 80 percent of the com- 
ments were expressions of benefits. This share dropped to 46 percent among 
respondents providing support. In contrast, essentially all of the comments of 
respondents expressing opposition or strong opposition were objections to the 
agreement. 
To summarize the positions of agricultural interest groups at the conclusion 
of the NAFTA negotiations, there was widespread support for the agreement 
among the AFBF and other market-oriented general-membership farm organi- 
zations, from most export-oriented producer groups for grains, oilseeds, live- 
stock, and some horticultural products, from many food processors and suppli- 
ers, and, among the sectors protected by  import quotas, within the dairy and 
cotton industries. Opposition was expressed by general-membership organiza- 
tions such as the NFU that favor domestic supply controls and labor unions. 
Wheat producers withheld support in an effort to obtain leverage on Canadian 
export issues, while producers and processors of peanuts, sugar, winter vege- 
5. The classification of  the responses is based on analysis of  their content by the  author and 
does not represent the view  of  the  Senate committee or its staff. A  summary of the  individual 
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tables, and citrus and other winter fruits expressed opposition to specific pro- 
visions of the agreement. 
7.6  Side-Agreements  and Implementing Legislation 
After the November  1992 elections,  the Clinton  administration  followed 
through  on  its campaign pledge not to reopen negotiations  on the original 
NAFTA text but to negotiate supplemental (side) agreements with respect to 
the environment, labor, and import surges. The administration worked closely 
with a coalition of private organizations during the negotiations for the envi- 
ronmental side-agreement and won the endorsement of NAFTA by  seven of 
the principal groups. The negotiations on the labor side-agreement were less 
ambitious than the negotiations on the environment and did not satisfy the 
concerns of organized labor nor its principal supporters in Congress. The AFL- 
CIO had essentially indicated it would oppose NAFTA regardless of the out- 
come of the side-negotiations and subsequently declared its continued intent to 
defeat the NAFTA implementing legislation in the House of Representatives. 
The side-agreement on import surges provided an opportunity to address the 
concerns of  the various agricultural producer interests. The sugar producers, 
in particular, had found a receptive audience in the new administration. One 
key Capitol Hill staff person expressed the view that the Bush administration 
had done poorly on the initial agreement for agriculture, especially for sugar. 
This concern was quickly recognized by the designated USTR, Mickey Kantor. 
As early as his January 1993 preconfirmation hearings, he pointed out that the 
side-agreement on import surges would “affect agriculture and particularly be 
protective, we hope, of the sugar industry, if  such a surge should take place” 
(U.S. Congress, Senate 1993). 
Despite  this  expressed  interest  in  providing  strengthened  protection,  the 
side-agreement  negotiated by  the Clinton  administration  only established  a 
consultative process to consider issues related to the original NAFTA emer- 
gency action provisions. While this process could expedite subsequent consid- 
eration of industry injury claims, the side-agreement did not address the types 
of changes sought in other initial provisions of NAFTA by  the agricultural 
producer groups. 
As the negotiations for the three side-agreements carried into the late sum- 
mer of  1993, the Clinton administration withheld active support for NAFTA 
pending their conclusion. Internal debate continued within the administration 
over the level of priority to place on the passage of NAFI‘A. In the meantime, 
between the signing of the initial agreement in December 1992 and completion 
of the side-agreements in August 1993, increased opposition to NAFTA was 
articulated by  individuals and groups that included some of the Democratic 
leadership of  Congress, the AFL-CIO, third-party presidential aspirant Ross 
Perot, some environmental, civil rights, and consumer groups, and conserva- 
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A setback for supporters of NAFTA came on June 30 when a federal district 
judge ruled  that its implementation required  an environmental impact state- 
ment.  This  ruling  could  have  indefinitely  delayed  consideration  of  the 
agreement by Congress. 
A subsequent low point for NAFTA supporters came after the congressional 
recess in August. Many members of  Congress were bombarded by  the vocal 
opposition to NAFTA by Ross Perot’s backers and others within their districts. 
Crucial  Republican  support for the  agreement  seemed  to be  slipping.  One 
high-ranking member of the White House NAFTA task force observed that the 
Perot people had done to Republican support for NAFTA what organized labor 
had done to the support among Democrats. 
In this setting, President Clinton used the September 13, 1993, signing cere- 
mony for the side-agreements to launch an intense campaign for implementa- 
tion of the agreement. The ruling that NAFTA required an environmental im- 
pact statement was overturned on September 24 by a unanimous decision of 
the U.S.  Court of Appeals. The Clinton administration then proceeded with 
efforts to build a broad public case for the benefits of NAFTA and to pursue 
the necessary votes in Congress “one or two and five or ten at a time.” Agricul- 
tural interest groups played a role in each of these strategies. 
7.6.1 
When it became apparent that NAFTA was in trouble in Congress, several 
of  the agricultural groups began to consider ways of making a more visible 
show of  support. Their perception early in the summer was that agriculture 
was viewed as divided on NAFTA, not as an industry that would benefit. Five 
groups-the  AFBF, the NCGA, the NCA, the National Pork Producers Coun- 
cil, and Farmland Industries-formed  an umbrella support organization called 
“Ag for NAFTA.” Membership was open to any agricultural group willing to 
add its name with no financial or other commitments required. Ag for NAFTA 
lent its support to the broader proagreement  coalition USA*NAFTA but re- 
mained separate in its financing, organizing, and activities. 
The perception of the Ag for NAFTA organizers was that the Clinton admin- 
istration was “hungry for support” since there was little grass-roots effort de- 
veloping in favor of the agreement. Ag for NAFTA brought 150 farm represen- 
tatives to Washington at the end of July and sponsored a variety of publicity 
activities. The staff person responsible for spearheading Ag for NAFTA ex- 
pressed the view that these activities (including press conferences at the House 
of Representatives  and with USTR Mickey  Kantor) had “completely turned 
around perceptions of agriculture’s views” despite receiving limited coverage. 
He rated their success on this initial objective as “excellent.” By September, 
Ag for NAFTA had 140 affiliated organizations. 
The next objective of Ag for NAFTA was to reassure members of Congress 
that they had a base of support if they voted for the agreement. One hundred 
and seventy members were targeted for attention. The tactic was simply to try 
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to insure  that  these  members  heard  from their  constituents  in  support  of 
NAFTA at town meetings, office visits, and through the mail. 
A third activity of Ag for NAFTA was to build grass-roots support for the 
agreement among their constituents. The organizers felt members of their own 
groups had been “bombarded with the opposition position” and viewed it as 
crucial to counter some of the opposition statements and dispel misconceptions 
among farmers. Supporters were encouraged to write to their newspapers, par- 
ticipate in radio talk shows, and take other steps to promote knowledge of the 
benefits of the agreement for agriculture. 
Much general commentary has been directed at the total levels of expendi- 
tures by various parties in their efforts to affect the NAFTA negotiations and 
congressional debate (see, e.g., Grayson  1993; Lewis and Ebrahim  1993). In 
the context of the millions of dollars of apparent expenditures, the scale of the 
Ag for NAFTA activities was modest. The key organizer devoted about one- 
half of  his time to NAFTA and another staff person  about one-fourth of  her 
time. Ag for NAFTA had an initial budget of about $10,000. The respective 
member  organizations  paid  the  travel  expenses  of  participants  in  Ag  for 
NAFTA activities, and its final budget for publicity, advertising, and other ex- 
penses was less than $100,000. 
In addition to the efforts of  Ag for NAFTA, the AFBF and many of the 
specific commodity associations also devoted  staff and resources to support 
passage of the NAFTA implementing legislation. Again, a typical commitment 
involved the assignment of one or two staff persons to preparation of informa- 
tional  materials  and  efforts  to  mobilize  the  membership  to  support  the 
agreement and convey their support to the public and Congress. The represen- 
tatives of these organizations  widely  acknowledged that their efforts would 
only be successful if President Clinton was fully committed. 
Opponents of NAFTA also continued to mobilize around the implementing 
legislation. The NFU made defeat of NAFTA one of its top priorities. It was a 
founding member of the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), the umbrella group 
that led the opposition efforts, and provided  the CTC with office space and 
other services. The NFU argued that supporters of NAFTA had not done the 
grass-roots organizing necessary  to succeed and launched grass-roots efforts 
of its own and in conjunction with the CTC. While not formally aligned with 
Ross Perot, representatives of  the NFU believed he had changed the media 
dynamics and reduced the prospects for passage of the implementing legis- 
lation. 
7.6.2  Wheat Opposition 
Continuing their break with the other export-oriented commodity groups, 
wheat producers held their support for NAFTA hostage to resolution of  the 
price transparency and transportation subsidy issues with Canada. Their repre- 
sentatives viewed these as issues on which they would “never give up.” In ex- 
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tration  to  take  action under  the  emergency provisions  of  section 22. The 
emergency provisions permit the secretary of agriculture to recommend imme- 
diate quotas or tariffs rather than wait for an ITC investigation and ruling. The 
wheat producers resisted prodding to join the coalition of NAFTA supporters 
unless their contentions toward Canada were addressed. A representative  of the 
NAWG viewed as its trump card an ability to “provide a level of comfort to 
members on the fence who want to vote for NAFTA but need political cover.” 
He expected “a lot of  hard bargaining” before the implementing legislation 
was approved. 
7.6.3  Division among the Import-Quota and TRQ-Protected Commodities 
The import-quota and TRQ-protected commodities pursued the different ap- 
proaches to the implementing legislation suggested by the particular circum- 
stances of  each sector. Consistent with  the dairy ATAC  report, the NMPF 
adopted a position of support for the agreement during summer 1993. Repre- 
sentatives of the NMPF met with Mickey Kantor to point out that it was the 
first section 22 group to endorse a trade agreement. They asked for his support 
in return for their “self-help” legislation and on favorable levels of dairy market 
access in the GATT Uruguay Round. The NMPF also sought support for its 
view that the provisions of the Canada-U.S. FTA  that eliminated agricultural 
tariffs would apply retroactively to dairy products if Canada were to tariffy its 
quantitative dairy trade barriers under a GATT agreement. Such an interpreta- 
tion of the language and intent of the Canada-U.S. agreement had been consis- 
tently opposed by Canadian milk producers and the Canadian negotiators. 
The NCCA also endorsed NAFTA in October 1993 rather than hold out for 
final concessions. The producer members of the council continued to express 
reservations about the agreement but agreed not to oppose the processors’ con- 
sensus in its favor. The NCCA made it clear, however, that it did not support 
the provisions of the pending GATT agreement with respect to cotton. 
While dairy and cotton interests moved toward support of NAFTA, peanut 
producers remained opposed. Some state organizations (in particular, Georgia) 
were very active in opposition. Other state organizations took a less active role 
because they did not want to alienate Congressman de la Garza after his efforts 
on their behalf. The Washington lobbyist for the producers pressed ahead with 
efforts to influence the implementing legislation, and the producer groups kept 
pressure on the members of Congress from districts where they had strength. 
The peanut producers indicated that the intensity of their final opposition to 
NAFTA would depend on the assurances provided in the implementing legisla- 
tion in terms of blocking transshipments, quality control, and other issues af- 
fecting access to their protected market. 
Sugar industry groups were also united on opposition to NAFTA. The sugar 
producers made strong efforts to obtain their two modifications of the initial 
agreement: inclusion of corn sweeteners in determining the balance of produc- 
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a ceiling on Mexico’s access for the full 15-year adjustment period. The sugar 
producers lobbied USDA and USTR and pressed their case through the Senate 
sweeteners caucus. A letter of support for the producers signed by 34 senators 
was given to the secretary of agriculture just prior to his consultations with the 
Mexican government in late August, together with separate letters of  support 
from Senators Conrad and Dole, a letter of  concern signed by  ambassadors 
from  16 Caribbean Basin Initiative countries, and the transcript of a public 
meeting intended to show that the Mexican sugar industry had advised its gov- 
ernment that it did not object to the U.S. producers’ recommendations. The 
sugar producers were satisfied that the secretary and the USTR understood 
their concerns and were sympathetic to them. Nevertheless, they committed to 
“go hell bent to defeat NAFTA” if the agreement was not revised. On Septem- 
ber 27, they pledged up to $500,000 to a campaign of opposition, indicating 
that their opposition would be withdrawn if their specific concerns were ad- 
dressed. 
The demands of the sugar sector brought into focus the competing interests 
of different commodity groups within U.S. agriculture and the relative strength 
of the Mexican and U.S. negotiating positions. The NCGA indicated that if the 
sugar provisions could be modified without changing the negotiated corn TRQ 
(2.5 MMT, compared to the 3.5 MMT the producers had sought initially), then 
they would not object, even though the modification would reduce the likeli- 
hood of additional demand being created by a shift to corn sweeteners in the 
Mexican  soft drink industry. The corn growers indicated they would oppose 
modifying the initial sugar agreement if  it involved lowering the negotiated 
corn TRQ. 
The sugar issues were even tougher on the Mexican side. Mexico was going 
to give up its traditional  and politically sensitive  protection  for corn under 
NAFTA and sought access to the U.S. sugar market as a potential opportunity 
for some of its agricultural producers. While Mexican  consumer well-being 
would be improved by lower corn prices, more than offsetting the loss to pro- 
ducers, sugar prices for consumers were to rise under NAFTA if Mexico ful- 
filled its pledge to raise tariffs on non-NAFTA countries to the U.S. over-quota 
level. The opportunity to sell some of its sugar in the protected U.S. market 
would offset part of the cost to Mexico of adjusting to U.S. sugar policies. The 
Mexican negotiators had worked hard for concessions on sugar, although, as 
indicated in the sweeteners ATAC report and elsewhere, most participants in 
the negotiations agreed that the Bush administration had not resisted provis- 
ions that might put pressure on the U.S. sugar program. In any case, Mexico 
did not consent to modifying the sugar provisions of the initial August  1992 
agreement until it became critical to do so near the end of the U.S. congres- 
sional deliberations. 
7.6.4  The Florida Coalition 
Working  along commodity  lines  as well  as through  the  unified  position 
among agricultural groups within the state, the Florida coalition pressed fur- 369  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
ther for accommodation of the concerns of sugar, winter vegetables, and citrus 
and other winter fruits. The fruit and vegetable producers continued to seek 
longer tariff phase-out periods for more commodities and price-based import 
surge safeguard mechanisms. They also continued to express concern about 
the effects on their competitiveness of disparities in environmental and labor 
regulations. A key  citrus representative described their particular goal as “a 
safeguard whereby if Mexico sells below a breakeven price for Florida produc- 
ers, then the tariff will snap back in place.”  Characterizing this as a “perma- 
nent” system, he argued for a tariff equal to the differences in costs of produc- 
tion  between  Florida  and  Mexico.  This  was  the  type  of  barrier to  trade 
popularized under the name of  a “social tariff” by  Ross Perot in his highly 
visible anti-NAFTA campaign (Perot and Choate 1993). 
The  coalition of  Florida agricultural producers remained central to  the 
NAFTA debate by  working closely with the state’s congressional delegation. 
Throughout the congressional deliberations about NAFTA legislation, almost 
the entire Florida delegation of  10 Democrats and  13 Republicans remained 
on record as opposed to the agreement. 
7.7  End-Game Concessions 
As  the  November  17  vote on the NAFTA  implementing legislation ap- 
proached, the administration continued to struggle to assemble a supportive 
coalition. Leaders of the opposition, including Congressmen Richard Gephardt 
and David  Bonior, the majority  leader and  second-ranking member of  the 
Democratic congressional leadership, claimed to be closing in  on the votes 
needed to defeat the legislation. Organized labor, the CTC, Ross Perot, and 
others pressed their opposition in public forums and congressional lobbying. 
With the fate of  the agreement uncertain in the House of  Representatives, 
the agricultural commodity groups were positioned to play a significant role in 
the bargaining to win support for the implementing legislation. Unlike orga- 
nized labor and other opponents publicly committed to defeat of the agreement 
in its entirety, most of the agricultural commodity groups had expressed oppo- 
sition only to specific aspects of the agreement. Moreover, between the Florida 
delegation and the sugar, peanut, and wheat interests, a large number of con- 
gressional votes rested at least in part on satisfying the concerns of the agricul- 
tural producers. 
The end game exploded into public view in early November. Concessions 
obtained for agriculture in the last two weeks of the debate are summarized in 
table 7.8. 
7.7.1  Initial Letters and Concessions 
An initial November 3 letter from the USTR to Mexico’s secretary of com- 
merce addressed concerns of the wine industry (Office of the U.S. Trade Rep- 
resentative 1993). The letter indicated that the United States would seek mu- 370  David Orden 
Table 7.8  Final NAFTA Concessions and Assurances to Agricultural Interests 
Item  Concession 
Winehandy 
Sugar 
US. to seek mutual agreement to accelerated tariff reductions 
Consumption of corn sweeteners included in the determination of net 
Mexican TRQ capped at 250,000 metric tons for the seventh through 
production surplus 
Citrus 
fourteenth years of the agreement 
gallons annually through 2002 (90 million gallons during 2003-07)  if 
the price of  fresh concentrated orange juice drops below an average 
based on the preceding five years for five consecutive days. 
GATT tariffs cuts on fresh and processed citrus products limited to 15 
percent 
Non-NAITA citrus juices to be reclassified as perishable commodities to 
MFN rate of duty on imports from Mexico in excess of 70 million 
expedite injury claims 
Citrus products not to receive additional special status under GSP or CBI 
Early-warning import surge mechanism 
GA’M tariffs cuts limited to 15 percent on tomatoes, peppers, lettuce, 
Fruits and vegetables 
Wheat 
Peanuts 
cucumbers, celery, and sweet corn 
Sensitive products not to receive additional special status under GSP or 
CBI 
Postponement of decertification of methyl bromide for use as a soil 
fumigant until 2000 
Funding for soil and postharvest fumigant research; completion and 
funding for U.S. Horticultural Research Station, Fort Pierce, Florida 
Doubled purchases of fresh tomatoes and new purchases of sweet corn 
for school lunch programs 
Trade representative assurance of effective price-based and volume-based 
tariff snapback provisions for fresh tomatoes and peppers 
End-use certificates to prevent subsidized reexport of Canadian wheat 
and barley 
Bilateral consultations to address transportation subsidies and Canadian 
Wheat Board pricing practices and an ITC investigation of whether 
imports interfere with the domestic wheat program within 60 days 
unless the consultations were successful 
buttedpaste from Canada and an ITC instigation of whether imports 
Bilateral consultations to address the increase in imports of peanut 
interfere with the domestic peanut program within 60 days unless the 
consultations were successful 
Secretary of agriculture assurance to work vigorously to limit the volume 
of imports from Canada 
Commissioner of customs assurance of at least 10 investigations and 350 
positions, including 100 new hires, to enforce rules of origin 
Transshipment 
tual agreement to accelerated tariff reductions for wine and brandy (as well as 
flat glass, home appliances, and bedding components). 
A  second and more significant  letter confirmed  the trade representative’s 
understanding that the two parties had agreed that substitution of corn syrup 
for sugar could “result in effects not intended by either Party” and that subse- 371  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
quently they had reached an agreement that consumption of corn syrup would 
be included in the determination of  “net production surplus.” The letter also 
indicated an agreement had been reached that, notwithstanding previous pro- 
visions, the ceiling for Mexican sugar sales in the United States under NAFTA 
would be  250,000 metric tons  for  the  seventh through  fourteenth  years.  In 
short, Mexico had conceded to the demands of the U.S. sugar producers. Sub- 
sequently,  the  sugar industry indicated  it would withdraw  its  opposition to 
NAFTA. At least a dozen votes in the House of Representatives were expected 
to be influenced to support the implementing legislation by  the decisions of 
the sugar associations. 
A third letter between the U.S. and Mexican negotiators addressed the issue 
of a price-based safeguard for citrus. The letter specified that the countries had 
agreed that if the U.S. price of fresh concentrated orange  juice dropped below 
an average based on the preceding five years for five consecutive days, then the 
United  States could apply the prevailing MFN rate of  duty on imports from 
Mexico in excess of 70 million gallons annually through 2002 and in excess of 
90 million  gallons annually  during 2003-07.  This change  provided  only a 
modest modification  of the original citrus provisions, nothing like the social 
tariff protection that had  been called for by  some representatives  of the in- 
dustry. 
In addition to this modest change in the provisions of NAFTA, the citrus 
producers had bargained for other concessions from the administration. The 
board of directors of Florida Citrus Mutual voted to withdraw their opposition 
to the agreement on November  10. They announced that the association had 
won three additional concessions: that tariffs on all forms of fresh and pro- 
cessed citrus products would not be cut more than 15 percent under the pend- 
ing Uruguay Round GATT agreement, that non-NAFTA citrus juices would be 
reclassified  as perishable commodities under U.S. law (expediting future in- 
jury claims by the industry), and that no foreign citrus products would receive 
additional special status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
or the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
As the anti-NAFTA Florida coalition collapsed and momentum was gained 
for passage of the implementing legislation by Congress, the other Florida fruit 
and vegetable producers also sought accommodation with the administration. 
Their representatives were not offered modifications of the agreement that re- 
quired the concurrence of Mexico. Instead, they were offered a range of admin- 
istrative concessions in exchange for helping deliver support for NAFTA from 
the Florida congressional delegation. These concessions included the use of an 
early-warning import  surge mechanism  and  limits for certain  commodities 
with respect to GATT, the GSP, and the CBI similar to those offered for citrus. 
They also included an environmentally controversial postponement of decerti- 
fication of methyl bromide for use as a soil fumigant until 2000 and funding 
for research intended to “insure that Florida agriculture would continue to have 
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fumigation (including funding for a particular horticultural research station). 
Finally, the administration agreed to increase purchases of fresh tomatoes and 
sweet corn for school lunch programs. Based on these concessions, the board 
of directors of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association announced they had 
voted to withdraw its opposition to NAFTA on November 11. 
7.7.2  The Final Days 
With less than a week before the scheduled congressional vote and with 
leaders of the opposition still claiming they would defeat NAFTA in the House 
of Representatives, the administration and its supporters could not relax their 
efforts to obtain passage of the implementing legislation. The Ag for NAFTA 
coalition sponsored a “fly-in’’ that brought 50 to 60 leaders of various member 
organizations to Washington  for a final round of lobbying on behalf  of  the 
agreement. They contributed to the decisions of a number of undecided repre- 
sentatives, but the real action was with the groups that had been or remained 
opposed. 
The wheat producers engaged in tense late-deal bargaining. They had been 
able to insert into the implementing legislation a provision for end-use certifi- 
cates  for  wheat  and  barley  intended  to  counteract  their  use  by  Canada 
and insure that Canadian products did not receive U.S.  export subsidies. How- 
ever, the producers’ earlier hopes for emergency section 22 import quotas were 
scuttled when,  by  several  accounts, the  administration  determined  that  the 
wheat growers could not influence many congressional votes. The wheat pro- 
ducers were told “emphatically” that the administration would not take emer- 
gency section 22 action. However, the president agreed to accommodate the 
producers by asking the ITC to initiate a section 22 investigation in 60 days to 
determine whether imports from Canada were interfering with the wheat sup- 
port programs of the Department of Agriculture. The ITC investigation would 
be undertaken  unless  there were successful bilateral  negotiations  to address 
Canadian  policies,  including “transportation  subsidies and Canadian Wheat 
Board pricing practices.” A letter from the president to this effect was sent to 
the ITC and several individual congressmen on November  15. The next day, 
less than 36 hours before the scheduled vote in the House of Representatives, 
the  NAWG  announced  it  would  “now  work  for congressional  approval  of 
NAFTA.” 
Partly on the basis of the wheat concessions, five congressmen, including 
two counted by the Associated Press as leaning against the agreement and two 
counted as undecided, announced their support for the implementing legisla- 
tion. One of these representatives, Congressman English, was also concerned 
about illegal transshipment of peanuts and beef through Mexico. To address 
the opposition of the peanut producers and Congressman English’s concerns, 
the president committed the administration to bilateral  consultations on im- 
ports of peanut butter from Canada and to a second ITC investigation within 
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he would “work vigorously . . . to limit the volume of  Canadian exports of 
peanut butter and paste,  which would include your  suggestion of  a cap at 
1 percent of U.S. domestic consumption.” Congressman English, who resigned 
shortly after the NAFTA vote to accept an appointment as head of the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, was also assured by the commissioner 
of customs that there would be “at least ten visits to agricultural processing 
sites in Mexico” and that “350 positions, including 100 newly hired employ- 
ees” would be assigned to enforcement of the NAFTA rules of origin. 
Final critical decisions were made by the Florida congressional delegation. 
It scheduled a closed-door meeting on Tuesday, November 16. An Associated 
Press poll had counted only five of the 23 members of the delegation as sup- 
porting or leaning toward supporting the agreement the previous day, so a large 
number of  votes were  at stake. Some of  the Florida agricultural producer 
groups, and many of the individual producers, disagreed with the decisions of 
Florida Citrus Mutual and the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association to with- 
draw their opposition. Moreover, the case against NAFTA had been made on 
numerous grounds in Florida. Not all of the state’s congressional representa- 
tives seemed convinced that the accommodations offered to agriculture were 
sufficient for them to support the agreement. 
A pivotal senior member of the Florida delegation was Representative Tom 
Lewis who served on the House Committee on Agriculture. To  provide Con- 
gressman Lewis with assurance about his concerns required an additional letter 
from Mickey Kantor specifying that NAFTA  contained “effective price and 
volume-based snapback provisions to deal with increased imports of fresh to- 
matoes and peppers.” The next day, Congressman Lewis and 12 other members 
of  the delegation voted with the administration. The NAFTA  implementing 
legislation passed in the House of Representatives by a 234-200  majority. 
7.7.3  Unconfirmed Deals 
In addition to the confirmed concessions and assurances and the votes that 
went with them, there were rumors in the press of more insidious deal making. 
One rumor was that the administration would back away from its intention to 
raise grazing fees on federal lands from $1.86 to $4.28 per animal unit in ex- 
change for support for NAFTA  from  10 western congressmen. The Interior 
Department denied such a connection (Wall Street Journal 1993b), but the ad- 
ministration  subsequently partially backed  down  and  proposed raising  the 
grazing fees to $3.96 over three years. 
It was also rumored that the $0.75 per pack increase in the cigarette tax 
proposed to finance health care reform might be scaled back in exchange for 
support for NAFTA. The administration denied such a deal but two North Car- 
olina Democrats, Charles Rose and Steve Neal, who had previously been op- 
posed or leaning toward opposition ended up voting in favor of the implement- 
ing legislation after several meetings with House Ways and Means Committee 
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had anything to do with the tobacco tax, and Congressman Rose, while vague, 
acknowledged that the president had not promised him anything (Wall Street 
Journal  1993a). The $0.75 tax was subsequently included in the president’s 
proposed 1995 budget. 
In the context of these rumors of possible deal making on issues not directly 
related to trade, it is of interest that one possible deal never seemed to be under 
consideration. Concurrent with the NAFTA debate, the administration was en- 
gaged in court-ordered discussions with Florida sugar and fruit and vegetable 
producers seeking an out-of-court settlement on a program to restore the Ever- 
glades. At issue were how to purge agricultural runoff  of  phosphorous  and 
other chemicals and who would pay the costs of  such efforts. The producers 
had agreed to take some land out of production to create filtration marshes, but 
the talks broke down in December  1993 over their demands for strong assur- 
ances on the limits of their future obligations. Despite the importance of the 
Florida delegation in the NAFTA debate, there was no linkage of the NAFTA 
vote to this environmental negotiation.6 
7.8  Conclusions from the NAFTA Outcomes 
In drawing inferences about the political economy of trade protection on the 
basis of the participation of various agricultural groups in the NAFTA negotia- 
tions and the congressional debate over its implementing legislation, a crucial 
issue is the extent to which the process provided a mechanism for overcoming 
established protection among agricultural sectors and expanding international 
markets. The NAFTA outcomes highlight the dual character of international 
negotiations that Putman (1988) has referred to as a simultaneous two-level 
game. At one level, a framework has to be established for a mutually accept- 
able international agreement. At a second level, any such agreement must be 
ratified within the domestic political processes of the negotiating partners. 
In the case of NAFIA, President Salinas and President Bush articulated sup- 
port for comprehensive liberalization of trade between Mexico and the United 
States. The high-level decision to include all agricultural products under pro- 
visions for long-run  trade liberalization was endorsed by  the Mexican side, 
within a relatively autocratic decision-making structure, and by some U.S. ag- 
ricultural interests. 
The decision to achieve liberalization of agricultural trade in the long run 
accomplished  bilaterally  one of  the  goals  of  the  original  US. zero-option 
GATT proposal and established a strong objective for the NAFTA  negotia- 
tions, especially compared to the relatively weak provisions for agriculture in 
previous trade agreements and the significant weakening of the zero option in 
6. There was some discussion within the sugar industry of  linking the two issues, but it was 
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the final Uruguay Round GATT agreement.7 For this reason, the provisions for 
agriculture negotiated between Mexico and the United States may deserve the 
“A’ grade received from Hufbauer and Schott (1993) in their NAFTA evalua- 
tion. However, Canada resisted participating  in an agreement of such broad 
scope for agriculture. Those interests in the negotiations that favored trade lib- 
eralization lacked sufficient influence to force Canadian concessions. Instead, 
they had to settle for extension of the less-comprehensive bilateral agricultural 
market  access  provisions  of  the  previous  Canada-U.S.  FTA  and  a  similar 
agreement between Mexico and Canada. 
Once the broad direction of the NAFTA negotiations was set, the domestic 
political process provided multiple points of access for interest groups in the 
United States to influence specific provisions of the agreement. The politically 
palatable but conflicting principles that expanded export opportunities were 
desirable but that imports should not cause too much disruption of domestic 
industries guided the negotiations toward the tariffication of quantitative im- 
port restrictions, with limited initial TRQs, high initial over-quota tariffs, and 
long transition periods for expanding market access and reducing tariff levels. 
Agricultural producer groups were faced with either seeking concessions re- 
lated to the parameters of the adjustment mechanisms or  simply opposing the 
agreement. Few of  the agricultural groups chose outright opposition. Rather, 
they acquiesced to the Bush and, subsequently, Clinton administrations’ sup- 
port for the long-term objectives of the agreement but sought modifications of 
specific adjustment provisions. 
From the efforts made on NAFTA by interest groups within agriculture and 
more widely, it is apparent that both groups that anticipated gains and those 
trying to avoid expected losses were involved in the decision-making process. 
At the risk of oversimplification, the stakes for various agricultural interest 
groups and the levels of their participation in the process are summarized in 
table 7.9. Rational behavior might be hypothesized to result in all groups fall- 
ing on the main diagonal of the table, with their positions and activity levels 
correlated with the likely economic impacts. 
To a large extent, agricultural interest group responses to NAFTA were con- 
sistent with its estimated economic impacts. The signs of  these impacts, to- 
gether  with  various  nonquantified  related  issues  (particularly  extension  of 
7. The final GATT agreement replaced quantitative restrictions (including all U.S. section 22 
quotas)  with  TRQs and  high  over-quota  tariffs  on  a multilateral  basis.  However, the  GATT 
agreement only requires minimal market access of  5  percent of  consumption under TRQs and 
reductions of over-quota tariffs by an average of 36 percent (15 percent minimum) after six years. 
The effectiveness of the over-quota tariff cuts on improving market access will  depend on the 
levels from which the cuts are made, and there is a strong possibility that the tariff equivalents of 
many quantitative restrictions were inflated. The final GATT agreement also places some limits 
on domestic support payments, unless they are decoupled from production levels, and constrains 
export subsidies. The U.S. implementing legislation stipulates that sugar imports from Mexico 
will be included in, not additional to, its global TRQ commitment. 376  David Orden 
Table 7.9  Summary of the Economic Stakes and the Activities of 
Interest Groups 
Activity Level 
Economic Stakes  Strong Support  Support  Opposition  Strong Opposition 
Positive  Corn 
Modestly positive  Processing  Feed grains 
Livestock 







Florida fruits and 
vegetables 
NAFTA to other countries), rather than the magnitude of the direct impacts 
often seemed important determinants of interest group behavior. Accounting 
for some of the related issues brings a closer correlation of the economic inter- 
ests of  some of the groups and their roles in the NAFTA process than is ini- 
tially evident. 
Given the different responses to NAFTA among agricultural interest groups, 
questions arise concerning the avenues of influence they utilized to affect the 
negotiated agreement or obtain subsequent concessions. A wide range of op- 
tions were available, and groups generally participated in the process in a vari- 
ety of  ways. A reasonable generalization is that groups that found the broad 
outline of the negotiations amenable to their interests were able to work closely 
with the negotiators and their technical staffs, and some path toward liberalized 
trade was achieved. Interest groups objecting to the general direction of  the 
negotiations sought redress through Congress. 
Too  much can be made, however, of the choice by  interest groups among 
avenues of influence on purely institutional grounds. Despite the broad com- 
mitment to the trade agreement by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, 
receptivity to the interests of specific groups changed after the 1992 election. 
In particular, support for the sugar program is usually identified with the Dem- 
ocratic party, and the tension between  sugar producer  groups and the trade 
negotiators during the Bush administration is not disputed by participants in 
the process. The Clinton administration signaled very early that it was more 
receptive to the concerns of the sugar sector, and this receptivity was reflected 
in the executive branch. Likewise, wheat producers did not expect much sup- 
port  from  the  executive branch  when  a Republican  administration  was  in 
power. Thus, even with bipartisan  support for NAFTA, there was a partisan 
aspect to the avenues that were effective for specific commodity groups. 
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to benefit from expanded export opportunities have difficulty becoming as or- 
ganized on their own behalf as interests likely to face increased competition 
(with reference to agriculture, see, e.g., McCalla 1993). This supposition is 
confirmed by various aspects of the agricultural interest groups’ activities on 
NAFTA. These aspects include the relative attention to NAITA in different 
agricultural magazines, the frequency of congressional testimonies by support- 
ers and opponents, the observations of  participants on the degree to which 
potential losses motivated commodity group involvement, the intensity of the 
opponents’ responses to the survey by  the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry, the resources committed to the debate over the imple- 
menting legislation by various producer groups, and the ability of the various 
groups to mobilize their supporters. 
Another set of questions related to the activities of  specific interest groups 
pertains to unanimity of the sectors seeking liberalization or protection. In the 
case of NAFTA, the strongest coalition to emerge naturally was the geographic 
coalition in Florida. The key members of the coalition were sugar, winter vege- 
tables, and citrus and other winter fruits. The Florida coalition had a strong 
presence during the negotiations and legislative deliberations, but its unanimity 
broke down in the final days of the congressional debate. Sugar was the most 
protected of the commodities in the coalition. Florida sugar producers, acting 
in unison with the sugar industry in other parts of the country, were able to 
strike their own deal with the Clinton administration and obtain substantial 
concessions. The other Florida commodities receive less protection than sugar. 
The producers of these commodities had no similar natural allies elsewhere 
and were less successful in their bargaining. Thus, the Florida coalition was 
only partially helpful in obtaining concessions for its member groups. 
Some other coalitions that might have emerged during the NAITA process 
were not evident among either export-oriented or import-competing interests. 
Notwithstanding the  efforts  of  Ag  for  NAFTA,  the  divisions among  the 
general-membership farm organizations precluded a united approach for the 
likely exporters.  Among the grains, wheat had idiosyncratic issues that affected 
its approach to the negotiations and  even  some corn growers opposed the 
agreement.  Among  the  import-competing  commodities,  the  specifics  of 
NAFTA looked favorable to the dairy and cotton sectors but not to the peanut 
and sugar sectors. Issue can be taken with the analyses of particular commodity 
groups, as in the case, for example, of USDA’s Office of Economics with the 
opposition expressed by peanut producers, but the point remains that the inter- 
est group perceptions precluded formation of coalitions. Issues extending be- 
yond NAFTA were particularly important in this regard. The dairy sector ap- 
parently anticipated better medium-term opportunities in world markets (or 
simply more success in obtaining export subsidies) than the peanut or sugar 
sectors, which face numerous pressures for greater foreign access to their do- 
mestic markets. 
A second aspect to the unanimity issues concerns groups other than produc- 378  David Orden 
ers that might benefit from trade or be harmed by protection. The sugar produc- 
ers were opposed by  the industrial sweetener users, but as in many previous 
policy decisions, the sweetener users were not very effective. Other processing 
and supply industries also supported NAFTA. The Food Marketing Institute 
and others among these industries argued that the agreement would  benefit 
consumers through lower prices. The general public did not express a strong 
position in terms of consumer prices but was heard from in terms of environ- 
mental issues, labor issues, and overall political support for NAFTA. The pro- 
portion of  the public favoring the agreement increased as the congressional 
vote approached but remained less than 50 percent by most late polls. 
A reason for some optimism in this context is that the final efforts to win 
support for NAFTA were successful. A bipartisan coalition, of which agricul- 
tural interests were only a small part, was marshalled to make the case for the 
agreement. The broad challenge to its leadership by the AFL-CIO, Ross Perot, 
and others was defeated. Thus, the danger that the United States would turn 
conspicuously inward on an important economic and foreign policy decision 
was held at bay in a post-Cold  War setting. In this regard, the disadvantages 
NAFTA created for Japan and the Europeans were unfortunately often touted 
as an argument. This theme undermines efforts to liberalize trade on a multilat- 
eral basis, quite to the contrary of the intent of the original consideration of 
bilateral agreements in the early 1980s. 
For agriculture, despite the apparent inability of the export-oriented interests 
to become as well organized in their own behalf as the import-competing inter- 
ests, and despite the grueling congressional NAFTA debate and the associated 
bargaining and concessions, the original provisions of NAFTA that eliminate 
trade barriers between Mexico and the United States in the long run remain 
largely intact. A careful examination also suggests that many of  the conces- 
sions and assurances offered to US.  agricultural interest groups to secure votes 
for the implementing legislation weaken the original NAFTA transition period 
provisions  only marginally. Other acknowledged concessions to  the interest 
groups are also relatively minor. 
This said, the notion that a trade agreement can serve as a channel for reform 
of  entrenched  domestic  U.S.  agricultural  programs  fared  poorly  under 
NAFTA. Among the protected commodities, dairy and cotton came to support 
the agreement only when strong rules of origin were adopted and the absence 
of any threat to their domestic markets became apparent. They conceded noth- 
ing generally about the protection they receive. Peanut producers fought hard 
against the agreement and battled in the end for concessions to sustain their 
protection. 
More  egregious  than  the  dairy  and peanut  provisions of  the  agreement, 
among its trade-distorting effects NAFTA initially  created a common  sugar 
market between Mexico and the United States from which both Mexican and 
U.S. producers were potentially going to benefit at the expense of consumers 
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which helped deliver over a dozen congressional votes, exacerbated the initial 
distortion by  essentially stealing from the Mexican producers some of their 
potential  market  opportunity  while  enhancing  the  potential  demand  facing 
U.S. producers. It was an impressive show of strength by the U.S. sugar indus- 
try. The concessions obtained gutted the agreement for freer bilateral trade, 
albeit within a protected common market, for at least the next 15 years. They 
also raise the question of whether the agreement to allow unrestricted trade in 
sugar  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  after  15  years  is  ultimately 
credible. 
The differences in the NAFTA outcomes between Mexico and Canada are 
also telling. The U.S. producer groups were most successful with respect to 
Mexico, which agreed to open itself to much more competition from U.S. ag- 
ricultural  products than did the United States to competition from Mexican 
products. Reducing trade bamers is good policy for Mexico overall, but Mexi- 
can  agricultural  producer  groups  that  might  have  supported  a  stronger 
agreement in terms of  their own export opportunities had  limited ability to 
influence the negotiations.  Nor was there much countervailing power to the 
pressure of  import-protected U.S. agricultural producers for concessions. To 
insure NAFTA’s  approval, the U.S. government  succeeded in pressing  these 
concessions on the Mexican government. 
It remains uncertain exactly  how Mexico will fulfill its NAFTA commit- 
ments on agriculture. Facilitating trade liberalization with transfer payments 
to its affected producers as part of the reform of its domestic agricultural policy 
may result in the anticipated increase in trade. But in light of the political rebel- 
lion launched in the southern state of Chiapas on the day NAFTA went into 
effect, and the subsequent assassination  of  the presidential candidate of  the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in March 1994, it also remains possible 
that Mexico will utilize its support policies to stimulate its domestic agricul- 
ture. No limits were set on domestic support levels under NAFTA and, while 
the GATT agreement subsequently imposed some constraints, such a policy 
reversal could dampen U.S.  export prospects compared to the expectations of 
some producer groups.* 
With Canada, the story is different. Throughout the NAFTA process, import- 
competing Canadian agricultural producers were more effective in defending 
their established protection than the Mexican producers. Canada’s participation 
in the  agreement was largely ignored in the United  States except by a few 
special interests. But to insure passage of the NAFTA implementing legisla- 
tion, the Clinton administration made unilateral promises to several U.S. ag- 
ricultural  commodity  groups about their perceived  grievances  over imports 
8. Alma Guillermoprieto (1994) relates the story of a July 1994 preelection campaign rally at 
which President Salinas distributed the first of close to four million checks providing direct income 
subsidies to campesinos. “And what are you going to do with the money?’ Salinas asked rhetori- 
cally. “Buy a tractor? Very good! Buy fertilizer? Excellent!” 380  David Orden 
from Canada. Thus, one outcome of the process was that it prolonged disputes 
between the United States and Canada over wheat, peanut butter, and other 
products. 
Given the focus on Mexico in the public NAFTA debate, the unresolved 
issues with Canada were a surprising outcome. Subsequent to NAFTA's  enact- 
ment, the United States offered to settle the agricultural trade disputes with 
Canada by adopting bilateral free trade in agricultural products. This offer was 
declined, and the United States then imposed a TRQ on peanut butter under 
the GATT agreement. This satisfied the domestic producer interests, and they 
withdrew  their request for an ITC investigation. For wheat, GATT ruled out 
establishing a permanent TRQ. The ITC issued a divided report (USITC 1994) 
on whether trade  barriers  were warranted under  section  22 provisions  that 
were, in any event, scheduled to expire when GATT took effect. After intense 
negotiations,  Canada then agreed to temporary bilateral trade restrictions. On 
both  counts, post-NAFI'A  agricultural trade between the United  States and 
Canada ends up more laden with barriers than before. 
On a somewhat different theme, the bargaining power agricultural  groups 
held toward the end of the NAFTA debate is striking. The agricultural interest 
groups positioned themselves to bargain for concessions because they sought 
modifications  of  specific provisions but did not explicitly oppose the entire 
agreement. The concerns of the Florida coalition, sugar, peanuts, or wheat mat- 
tered to the outcome of close to 30 congressional votes. 
The question that arises is why other groups did not do more to put them- 
selves in such a position. The concessions made to agriculture toward the end 
of the debate were not the only concessions offered by the Clinton administra- 
tion. One wonders, for example, why the AFL-CIO did not approach the presi- 
dent with concerns about specific industries and to seek additional transition- 
period protection in these areas in exchange for delivering their support for the 
agreement. One can imagine a very different coalition having been put together 
to pass the implementing legislation in such circumstances. Agricultural inter- 
ests could have found themselves irrelevant to the congressional vote and the 
sugar and wheat producers sent away to make their case in another context. 
Curiously, one doubts these parties to last-minute  concessions  were  the  in- 
tended beneficiaries of organized labor's political efforts. 
Consideration of possible alternative coalitions in support of NAFTA also 
raises the question of whether one-by-one bilateral negotiations offer any real- 
istic hope for reducing  agricultural  or other trade barriers  on an  extensive 
(eventually global) basis. Though free trade zones are proliferating, the lesson 
from NAFTA seems discouraging. For each agreement one can imagine the 
various  specific interest groups lining up in different arrays. Favoring trade 
liberalization when it is to their advantage, these interest groups lobby equally 
strongly for benefits that come from introducing policy distortions rather than 
removing them. On these shifting sands, negotiating multiple FTAs and build- 
ing coalitions in their support looks like it leads to drudging trench warfare. 381  Agricultural Interest Groups and NAFTA 
For agriculture, in particular, attaining freer trade with Mexico under NAFTA 
accomplished only a small percentage of the goals sought eventually through 
GATT. Progress to be sure, but at such a rate as perhaps to  be negligible unless 
the agreement with Mexico becomes a prototype for multilateral trade liberal- 
ization in the long run. This is the outcome that protected agricultural interests 
claim to fear but so far have avoided. 
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Comment  Robert Paarlberg 
David Orden has done a clean and careful job of reconstructing the U.S. side 
of  the agricultural component of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). I am in strong agreement with most of  his judgments, especially 
near the end of the paper, but there are some shades of difference along the way. 
Orden starts by implying that the agricultural component of NAFTA was a 
victory  for free trade,  perhaps  more  so than  the  Uruguay  Round,  because 
NAFTA successfully embraced the original. Uruguay Round concept of phas- 
ing out all border protection. I would suggest toning down this assertion. In its 
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agricultural component, NAFTA did  significantly  liberalize some important 
import-competing  sectors on the Mexican  side (especially corn), but it did 
nothing to eliminate some important existing distortions on the U.S. side. In 
corn markets, while Mexican growers will lose their tariffs and import licenses, 
U.S. growers will not lose their target prices and deficiency payments (a do- 
mestic measure which nonetheless functions in part like an export subsidy). In 
corn markets, this was unilateral disarmament for Mexico. 
And most conspicuously, NAFTA did not significantly liberalize U.S. sugar 
policy. Instead, it just extended the highly illiberal pricing regime created by 
that policy to sugar producers in Mexico (by raising  Mexico’s tariffs  to the 
over-quota U.S. level). U.S. sugar growers complained about this because of 
fears that the eventual result in Mexico would be a replay of what had already 
happened in the United States: a replacement of sugar in beverages by high- 
fructose corn sweeteners, freeing up sugar for export to the United States. Or- 
den accurately describes these details when his analysis gets to the case of 
sugar, but he never quite qualifies the earlier assertion that NAFTA was a vic- 
tory for nondistorting free trade. 
A larger concern, however, is with the process lessons that can and cannot 
be drawn from this case. If the dependent variable is policy liberalization, then 
there is probably more to be learned on the Mexican side of NAFTA than on 
the U.S. side. And on the Mexican side, I  suspect most of  the liberalization 
that occurred came neither from the bargaining dynamic of the NAFTA negoti- 
ation, nor from an internal dynamic of  interest group representation  within 
Mexico. Mexico was able to liberalize agriculture because the Mexican gov- 
ernment  is  an  authoritarian  one-party  presidential  state.  Even  before  the 
NAFTA agreement, President Salinas (and his mostly nonaccountable techno- 
cratic  advisers)  had  decided  to  shift Mexican  agriculture  out  of  low-value 
maize production and into higher-value fruit and vegetable crops. Salinas was 
able to do this without much concern about opposition, within the system, from 
Mexico’s own corn producers because the Mexican government operates top 
down rather than bottom up (a surprising expression of opposition came later 
from outside of the political system, with the January  1, 1994, Zapatista up- 
rising). 
Probably the most useful process lesson drawn by  Orden at the U.S. end is 
his observation that agricultural interest groups gained influence for the para- 
doxical reason that they were neither for the agreement in principle, nor op- 
posed  in  principle,  a  stance  which  made them  worth  courting  with  side- 
payments.  The  ability  of  farm groups  to  pursue  commodity-specific  side- 
payments in this fashion, outside of the confines of the normal farm bill pro- 
cess, deserves more attention. Sugar producers set the standard in 1981 when 
they held up that year’s budget process for a revived domestic sugar program. 
Orden’s paper shows how wheat growers were able to use the NAFTA vote 
on Mexico to gain additional concessions in their running trade disputes with 
Canada. And the paper by Bruce Gardner in this volume (chap. 6) shows how 384  David Orden 
one or two wheat-state senators were able to use a 1985 Senate budget resolu- 
tion vote to get a $2 billion Export Enhancement Program. 
The political lesson would seem to be an almost impossible one to apply: 
liberal-minded presidents should do their best to avoid large, make-or-break, 
close votes in Congress. In winning such votes, the president can easily end up 
giving away more than he gains. 